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A B S T R A C T
This dissertation analyses real exchange rate dynamics and the role of fiscal policy within the setting
of a monetary union consisting of two regions. It seeks to address three research questions: What are
the policy regimes that yield determinate equilibria in the absence of trade? What is the role of labour
mobility across production sectors within an economy in real exchange rate dynamics? And should a
national fiscal authority respond to these changes in the real exchange rate, i.e. the domestic inflation
differential, to improve domestic welfare?
The first essay finds that with autarkic member countries, a monetary authority following the Taylor
principle is insufficient to render an equilibrium determinate if it is not coupled with exactly one ‘active’
fiscal policy. This is because it can only determine union-wide inflation but not its individual components,
i.e. national inflation rates, as it is limited to a single policy instrument, the nominal interest rate. The
model shows that fiscal shocks originating in the economy with an active fiscal stance affect domestic
inflation but also spill over into the economy whose fiscal policy stance is passive. This finding helps
understand to what extent fiscal inflation might materialise in a monetary union in which equalisation of
prices is disturbed, as captured by the assumption of autarky in this essay.
The second essay shows that assuming perfect labour mobility across production sectors significantly
hampers the model’s ability to generate rich real exchange rate dynamics following sector-specific shocks.
In an empirical application, I decompose the drivers of Spanish real exchange rate variability and show
that estimating the degree of labour mobility considerably improves the model’s fit to the data. Moreover,
it exposes a distinct transmission mechanism of traded-sector productivity shocks and decisively adjusts
the variance decomposition compared to estimation results in a model assuming perfect labour mobility.
The third essay considers real exchange rate variability as a fiscal target for national fiscal authorities
in a monetary union. A welfare analysis that calculates consumption equivalents quantifies the bene-
fits of fiscal rules that are responsive to the domestic inflation differential. It finds a large scope for
welfare-enhancing fiscal intervention in the set of budget-neutral rules which rely on consumption and
labour income taxes. The compression of inflation differentials and thus of domestic inflation raises mean
consumption by lowering the degree of price dispersion throughout the economy, thereby outweighing
welfare losses that stem from a higher volatility in distortionary taxes.
IV
Z U S A M M E N F A S S U N G
Diese Dissertation analysiert reale Wechselkursdynamiken und die Rolle von Fiskalpolitik in einer
Währungsunion, die sich aus zwei Regionen zusammensetzt. Drei Forschungsfragen werden adressiert:
Welche politischen Regime führen in Abwesenheit von Handel zu determinierten Gleichgewichten? Welche
Rolle spielt Arbeitsmobilität über Produktionssektoren hinweg innerhalb einer Volkswirtschaft für die
Dynamik des realen Wechselkurses? Und sollte nationale Fiskalpolitik auf diese Änderungen des realen
Wechselkurses, d.h. auf Inflationsdifferenziale, reagieren, um den inländischen Wohlstand zu erhöhen?
Das erste Essay stellt fest, dass bei autarken Mitgliedsländern eine Geldpolitik nach Taylor-Prinzip
nicht ausreicht, um ein Gleichgewicht zu determinieren, wenn sie nicht mit einer "aktiven" Fiskalpolitik
gekoppelt ist. Dies liegt daran, dass sie nur die unionsweite Inflationsrate bestimmen kann, nicht jedoch
ihre einzelnen Komponenten, d.h. die nationalen Inflationsraten, da sie auf ein einziges politisches In-
strument, den nominalen Zinssatz, beschränkt ist. Das Modell zeigt, dass fiskalische Schocks aus der
Volkswirtschaft mit einer aktiven Fiskalpolitik die Inlandsinflation beeinflussen, sich aber auch auf die
Volkswirtschaft auswirken, deren fiskalische Haltung passiv ist. Dieses Ergebnis hilft zu verstehen, in
welchem Maße fiskalische Inflation in einer Währungsunion zustande kommen kann, in der die Preisan-
passung gestört ist, wie festgehalten durch die Annahme von Autarkie in diesem Essay.
Das zweite Essay zeigt, dass die Annahme von perfekter Arbeitsmobilität über Produktionssektoren
hinweg die Fähigkeit des Modells erheblich beeinträchtigt, ausgiebige Dynamiken des realen Wech-
selkurses nach sektorspezifischen Schocks zu generieren. In einer empirischen Anwendung zerlege ich
die Treiber der spanischen realen Wechselkursvariabilität und zeige, dass die Schätzung der Arbeitsmo-
bilität die Modellanpassung an die Daten erheblich verbessert. Darüber hinaus deckt es einen eindeuti-
gen Übertragungsmechanismus für Produktivitätsschocks im Handelssektor auf und passt die Varianzzer-
legung im Vergleich zu Schätzergebnissen in einem Modell an, das perfekte Arbeitsmobilität annimmt.
Der dritte Aufsatz erwägt reale Wechselkursschwankungen als Zielvariable für nationale Fiskalpoli-
tiken in einer Währungsunion. Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse, die Konsumäquivalente berechnet, quantifiziert
die Vorteile von Steuerregeln, die auf das inländische Inflationsdifferenzial reagieren. Sie findet großen
Spielraum für wohlfahrtsfördernde, fiskalische Interventionen im Rahmen von budgetneutralen Regeln
für Konsum- und Lohnertragssteuern. Die Komprimierung des Inflationsdifferenzials und damit der
heimischen Inflation erhöht den Durchschnittskonsum, indem die Preisstreuung in der Volkswirtschaft
verringert wird, welches Wohlfahrtsverluste durch volatilere verzerrende Steuern aufwiegt.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by its last signatory, Germany, irrevocably created the single
currency area, the European Monetary Union. The introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 undoubt-
edly accelerated the European integration process on an economic and political level, despite the set-backs
of the past decade. However, the history of monetary unions and fixed exchange rate regimes reminds us
that they are institutions that must be actively maintained and not taken for granted.
The Maastricht Treaty specified several convergence criteria aimed at reducing existing asymmetries
and monitoring national fiscal budgets within the envisaged monetary union. The first is directly con-
cerned with inflation. To be eligible to join the monetary union, a country’s inflation rate is required to
not exceed the average of the three lowest inflation rates observed across EU member states by more than
1.5 percentage points. This alignment of inflation rates was meant to ensure that a centralised monetary
authority could use its policy rate to target a union-wide inflation rate composed of relatively similar
national inflation rates.
The convergence of inflation rates prior to the introduction of the euro was impressive. In particular,
countries in the southern periphery with historically higher inflation rates achieved inflation rates by the
late 1990s comparable to those of Germany. However, the return of growing inflation rate dispersion
in the 2000s led to a recurring divergence of competitiveness between the European core and periphery
countries that could not be addressed by the European Central Bank. A painful readjustment through the
real economy seemed inevitable.
The Maastricht criteria concerned with sound and sustainable public finances specified fiscal rules for
national governments to follow. Most notably, the government debt-to-GDP ratio should remain below
60% and the annual government budget deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP. After Germany, as the
first eurozone country to do so, failed to meet this deficit limit in 2002 and the European Commission
abstained from imposing disciplinary measures, the Maastricht criteria lost their bite. With the onset of the
global financial crisis, after almost a decade of steady growth, public finances in the southern European
periphery eroded visibly and, combined with the loss of external competitiveness, led to the European
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debt crisis. It became apparent that a better understanding of the role of fiscal policy in currency unions
was crucial. The EMU must consider deeper fiscal interaction across borders if it wishes to avoid further
economically and politically disrupting crises across its member countries. To this end, this dissertation
seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the role of fiscal policy in a currency union, EMU inflation
dynamics, and to what extent fiscal policy should actively contribute to a harmonisation of inflation rates.
The first essay, When the Taylor principle is insufficient – A benchmark for the fiscal theory of the
price level in a monetary union, analyses determinacy regions for policy parameters for two autarkic
countries that together constitute a monetary union. The results shed light on equilibrium properties
and highlight that, in the absence of an equalisation process of prices through trade integration, union-
wide monetary policy conducted according to the Taylor principle will not suffice to uniquely determine
individual countries’ inflation rates. Furthermore, it is shown how the necessity of an ‘active’ fiscal policy
to uniquely determine an equilibrium leaves scope for fiscal policy spillovers and fiscal inflation.
The second essay, Real exchange rate dynamics and labour mobility, deals with the drivers of ex-
change rate variability in a monetary union from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective for
Spain. Importantly, it analyses the role of labour mobility across production sectors for the transmission
mechanism of sector-specific shocks and shows that the assumption of perfect labour mobility signifi-
cantly impedes the asymmetric transmission mechanism of sector-specific shocks due to identical sector-
wages. The estimation results for Spain suggest that labour is imperfectly mobile across sectors. The
variance decomposition of real exchange rate variability relative to the rest of the eurozone emphasises
demand disturbances as its main driving force, which could imply the necessity of fiscal stabilisation.
Finally, the third essay, Budget-neutral fiscal rules targeting inflation differentials, analyses the ben-
efits of budget-neutral tax rules for a national fiscal authority that responds to its domestic inflation dif-
ferential, i.e. the difference between its domestic inflation rate and the union-wide average. The welfare
analysis finds that consumption taxes should be raised while labour income taxes should be lowered in
response to domestic inflation exceeding the union-wide average if welfare costs of business cycle fluc-
tuations are to be lowered. By doing so, the fiscal authority compresses the domestic inflation differential
by dampening the response of domestic inflation to asymmetric disturbances. In turn, mean price dis-
persion is lowered, allowing for higher mean consumption under the responsive tax rules. Not only the
rules relying on lump-sum financing but also those that exclusively make use of distortionary taxes are
able to raise welfare, mostly under both demand as well as supply disturbances. Given the assumption of
budget-neutrality, these results help further motivate sustainable fiscal interventions that aim at reducing
asymmetries in inflation rates across EMU countries.
2
F I R S T E S S A Y
When the Taylor principle is insufficient – A benchmark for
the fiscal theory of the price level in a monetary union
This paper derives restrictions on monetary and fiscal policies for determinate equilibria in
a two-country monetary union with autarkic members. It finds that a central bank following
the Taylor principle may not be sufficient for determinacy unless accompanied by one ‘active’
fiscal authority as described by Leeper (1991). Alternatively, both fiscal authorities can be
active while the central bank abandons the Taylor principle to yield determinacy. The two
determinate equilibria have significantly different implications for the transmission of fiscal
and monetary shocks and for the fiscal theory of the price level in a monetary union.
3
1.1 Introduction
There has been a considerable amount of research on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) in the con-
text of monetary unions.1 However, these analyses seem to be limited, as they rest upon the assumption of
a common price level throughout the union. This assumption is generally rationalised by intensified trade
within a currency union such that prices and hence inflation rates are perfectly aligned. Yet this appears
to be a particularly special case. Often enough, one does not observe the aforementioned alignment of
inflation rates but instead persistent and significant differences, for example due to non-tradable goods.
Via the abstraction from trade and thus introduction of country-specific price levels and inflation rates,
this paper sheds light on the other end of the spectrum. The results are threefold. First, the analysis shows
that the central bank can be impotent to stabilise inflation rates across union countries. Second, it re-
veals which fiscal policy combinations support determinacy and how spillover effects from national fiscal
shocks occur within the union. Third, it uncovers under which conditions fiscal inflation is unavoidable in
a monetary union. The results of this paper, based on the assumption of autarkic members of a monetary
union, represent an extreme benchmark for the fiscal theory of the price level.
Section 1.2 presents a simple model of a monetary union with one central bank and two fiscal author-
ities, while Section 1.3 discusses parameter regions which yield determinate, indeterminate, or unstable
equilibria. Properties of the determinate equilibria are derived in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The model
The model is a simple cashless extension of Leeper’s (1991) single closed endowment economy of a
monetary union consisting of two autarkic countries, Home (H) of size n and Foreign (F) of size 1 − n
with n ∈ (0, 1).2 While monetary policy is common to both countries in the union, fiscal policies are
country-specific. The absence of trade delivers a simple justification for country-specific price levels
while preserving the possibility of identical inflation expectations across both countries.
Each country i ∈ {H, F} consists of a single household which maximises expected lifetime utility
derived from consumption, Ct, as in
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
βk log(Cit+k) (1.1)
1See for instance Woodford (1996), Sims (1997), Bergin (2000), and Leith & Wren-Lewis (2000).
2The results of the single economy in Leeper (1991) are nested in this analysis for n ∈ [0; 1].
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subject to
Cit +
Bit
Pit
+ τit = Y
i + Rt−1
Bit−1
Pit
, (1.2)
where Rt denotes the risk-free nominal interest rate set by the central bank, Pit the domestic price level,
and Bit bond holdings of the household of its domestic government. In each period, each country is
endowed with YH = YF = Y units of the consumption good of which a constant fraction GH = GF = G is
consumed by the respective government.3
The households’ optimality conditions after imposing market clearing are
1
Rt
= βEt
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ 1
πHt+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ and 1Rt = βEt
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ 1
πFt+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (1.3)
where πit+1 = P
i
t+1/P
i
t denotes gross inflation. Evidently, inflation expectations are identical across both
member countries of the monetary union. However, actual domestic inflation rates might differ due to
country-specific disturbances.
Governments control domestic lump-sum taxes, τit, and issue debt to finance their expenses, G, in
each period. The budget constraint for the government in i reads
Bit
Pit
+ τit = G + Rt−1
Bit−1
Pit
. (1.4)
Following Leeper (1991), fiscal authorities adjust their lump-sum taxes in response to the previous pe-
riod’s level of real debt, bit = B
i
t/P
i
t, according to
τit = γ
i
0 + γ
ibit−1 + ψ
i
t . (1.5)
Union-wide inflation, πUt , is defined as the weighted average of national inflation rates according to
the respective country size such that
πUt = nπ
H
t + (1 − n)πFt . (1.6)
At the union level, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to union-wide
3A positive correlation between the endowment and country size does not alter the results.
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inflation as in
Rt = ϕ0 + ϕπUt + θt . (1.7)
The country-specific fiscal shocks, ψit, and the common monetary policy shock, θt, are assumed to
follow AR(1) processes of the form
ψit = ρ
iψit−1 + e
i
t , where |ρi| < 1, eit ∼ N(0, σ2i ) , (1.8)
θt = ρθt−1 + et , where |ρ| < 1, et ∼ N(0, σ2) . (1.9)
These innovations represent unsystematic policy behaviour stemming from policy implementation errors
or unmodeled economic disturbances. It is assumed that eHt , e
F
t and et are serially and mutually uncorre-
lated.
1.3 Model solution and indeterminacy
The model’s equations can be reduced to a recursive system in domestic inflation rates and real debt.
Combining (1.3) with (1.7) and linearisation yields
Et
[
πˆHt+1
]
= ϕβ[nπˆHt + (1 − n)πˆFt ] + βθt and (1.10)
Et
[
πˆFt+1
]
= ϕβ[nπHt + (1 − n)πFt ] + βθt , (1.11)
where hat-variables denote deviations from the deterministic steady state.4 Substitution of the policy rules
into the government budget constraints delivers laws of motion for real debt in H and F which read
bˆHt = (1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 −
b
πβ
πˆHt +
bϕ
Rβ
πˆUt−1 − ψHt +
b
Rβ
θt−1 and (1.12)
bˆFt = (1/β − γF)bˆFt−1 −
b
πβ
πˆFt +
bϕ
Rβ
πˆUt−1 − ψFt +
b
Rβ
θt−1 . (1.13)
Since πˆUt can be eliminated, the system consists of two state (bˆ
H
t , bˆ
F
t ) and two jumping (πˆ
H
t , πˆ
F
t ) variables.
According to Blanchard & Kahn (1980), the system requires two stable and two unstable roots in order
to be determinate.
As in Leeper (1991), a policy is considered to be ‘active’ (‘passive’) if the respective authority is
unconstrained (constrained) by budgetary conditions such that the associated eigenvalue with this policy is
4Due to the model’s near linearity, linearisation delivers a reasonably accurate approximation.
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greater (smaller) than one in absolute values. The two eigenvalues associated with fiscal policy parameters
are 1
β
− γH and 1
β
− γF , and are identical to Leeper’s one-country case. The eigenvalue associated with
monetary policy is ϕβ, while the last eigenvalue of the system is zero. The zero-eigenvalue is a result
that is independent of the size parameter n and implies that monetary policy can only fix one jumping
variable.
Figure 1.1 illustrates parameter regions of eigenvalues associated with fiscal policies dependent on the
monetary policy regime being active or passive. Region I is characterised by having three to four stable
0 1
1
| 1
β
− γH |
|1 β
−
γ
F
|
Region I Region II
Region II Region IV
(a) Active monetary policy (|ϕβ| > 1)
1
1
| 1
β
− γH |
|1 β
−
γ
F
|
Region I
Region III
(b) Passive monetary policy (|ϕβ| < 1)
Figure 1.1: Parameter regions
roots such that equilibria in this region are indeterminate. In Figure 1.1a in Region II, the combination of
active monetary policy and one active fiscal authority yields exactly enough stable roots for determinacy.
Similarly, in Region III in Figure 1.1b, two active fiscal policies in conjunction with passive monetary
policy provide two unstable and two stable roots for the system yielding a determinate equilibrium. In
Region IV in Figure 1.1b however, three active authorities generate three unstable roots, preventing the
existence of a stable equilibrium.
The striking result is that an active monetary policy following the Taylor principle via ϕ, i.e. raising
the interest rate by more than one in response to variations in inflation, fails to uniquely determine an
equilibrium unless it is accompanied by one active fiscal policy as displayed by Region II in Figure 1.1a.
Mathematically, equations (1.6), (1.10) and (1.11) form a subsystem in three variables which does not
deliver a unique solution, as has been already indicated by the zero-eigenvalue of the full system. Active
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monetary policy alone is not able to resolve the inherent indeterminacy.
The economic intuition for this result is straightforward. The central bank has one available policy
instrument with which it can uniquely determine union-wide inflation. But due to the isolation of each
country within the union, country-specific inflation rates are not uniquely tied together. So even if the
weighted average of individual inflation rates, πˆUt , is determined by monetary policy, its components, πˆ
H
t
and πˆFt , may drift apart. Thus, active monetary policy on the union level combined with two passive fiscal
policies necessarily renders the equilibrium indeterminate.5
1.4 Equilibrium properties
The following section derives certain properties of the two determinate equilibria in order to illustrate
differences in shock transmission mechanisms and the possibility of fiscal inflation across equilibria.
1.4.1 Region II equilibrium
When monetary policy is active (|ϕβ| > 1), one can solve for union-wide inflation by combining (1.10)
and (1.11) to
πˆUt =
β
ρ − ϕβθt . (1.14)
Union-wide inflation is entirely determined by monetary policy shocks, θt, while country-specific fiscal
shocks have no impact.
When fiscal policy in H is active (|1/β − γH | > 1), its respective budget constraint has the forward
solution
bˆHt =
ρH
1/β − γH − ρH ψ
H
t , (1.15)
where debt depends solely on domestic fiscal shocks. Substitution back into the budget constraint yields
H’s inflation rate which reads
πˆHt = −
πβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
πβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + ϕβπˆUt−1 + βθt−1 . (1.16)
The inflation rate under an active fiscal regime depends on domestic fiscal shocks as well as on past
monetary policy shocks. Under active fiscal policy, domestic fiscal shocks cause a wealth effect for
5Note that this result is independent of the size parameter n ∈ (0, 1).
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domestic residents, thereby explaining the dependence of πˆHt on ψ
H
t and revealing the scope for fiscal
inflation. In the absence of domestic fiscal shocks, πˆHt is pegged to expected union-wide inflation, as the
last two expressions in Equation (1.16) represent Et−1[πˆUt ].
Finally, via (1.6) the inflation rate in F is found to read
πˆFt =
1
1 − n
β
ρ − ϕβθt
+
n
1 − n
[(
−πβ
bH
) ( 1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
πβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + ϕβπˆUt−1 + βθt−1
]
.
(1.17)
Inflation in F responds to fiscal shocks originating in H but not to domestic fiscal shocks. These fiscal
shock spillovers are of such magnitude that πˆUt remains at its steady state due to the active monetary
policy. Fiscal shocks in F do not affect πˆFt , as its fiscal stance ensures domestic debt stability, i.e. they do
not cause a wealth effect. Hence fiscal inflation is not present in F.
Lastly, the debt stock in F evolves according to the backward solution of its government budget
constraint
bˆFt =
∞∑
k=0
(1/β − γF)k
(−bF
πβ
πˆFt−k +
bF
Rβ
(
ρ
ρ − ϕβ
)
θt−1−k − ψFt−k
)
. (1.18)
1.4.2 Region III equilibrium
Under passive monetary policy, both its associated eigenvalues are smaller than one. Consequently, de-
terminacy requires both fiscal policies to be active so that both government budget constraints have a
forward solution:
bˆHt =
ρH
1/β − γH − ρH ψ
H
t and (1.19)
bˆFt =
ρF
1/β − γF − ρF ψ
F
t . (1.20)
Equilibrium real debt depends on the respective fiscal shock of the country but is unaffected by monetary
policy shocks. As before, one can substitute bˆit back into the respective government budget constraint to
determine individual inflation rates which read
πˆHt = −
πβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
πβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1 + ϕβπˆUt−1 + βθt−1 and (1.21)
πˆFt = −
πβ
bF
(
1/β − γF
1/β − γF − ρF
)
ψFt +
πβ
bF
(1/β − γF)bˆFt−1 + ϕβπˆUt−1 + βθt−1 . (1.22)
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Inflation in i depends on its domestic fiscal shock, meaning that both countries exhibit scope for fiscal
inflation. Contrary to the case in Region II, there are no direct spillovers of domestic fiscal shocks to the
other country in the union. As before, by behaving actively a fiscal authority pegs its national inflation
rate to the expected union-wide inflation.
Finally, by combining (1.21) and (1.22) one obtains the expression for union-wide inflation
πˆUt = n
[
−πβ
bH
(
1/β − γH
1/β − γH − ρH
)
ψHt +
πβ
bH
(1/β − γH)bˆHt−1
]
+ (1 − n)
[
−πβ
bF
(
1/β − γF
1/β − γF − ρF
)
ψFt +
πβ
bF
(1/β − γF)bˆFt−1
]
+ ϕβπˆUt−1 + βθt−1 ,
(1.23)
which is no longer shielded from country-specific fiscal disturbances. Similarly to the case for a single
economy, a passive monetary authority loses the ability to determine its associated inflation rate on its
own.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper finds that a central bank may fail to stabilise inflation across autarkic member countries of
a monetary union. This result calls into question the universal validity of the Taylor principle when
inflation rates of individual member countries are not tied together due to e.g. adjustments in terms of
trade. Additionally, these findings have implications for the FTPL in a monetary union, as they show how
an active or irresponsibly acting fiscal policy might be necessary for determinacy and how this allows for
fiscal inflation.
Because they concern the extreme case of autarky across union member countries, the results serve
as a benchmark and motivate a deeper analysis of multiple equilibria and fiscal inflation in multi-country
settings with trade in goods and financial assets. Future research should focus on the inclusion of these
features and analyse how different policy coordination schemes in a monetary union alter equilibrium
characteristics.
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S E C O N D E S S A Y
Real exchange rate dynamics and labour mobility
This paper shows that labour mobility across sectors plays a crucial role in determining
real exchange rate dynamics following sector-specific shocks. In particular, a New Keynesian
DSGE model of a monetary union with perfect intersectoral labour mobility cannot repro-
duce a real appreciation when traded-sector productivity increases. Allowing for imperfect
intersectoral labour mobility enables the model to produce a potential appreciation through
rising non-traded goods prices and delivers testable restrictions for model parameters gov-
erning the degree of labour mobility. A Bayesian estimation of the model for Spain and the
rest of the eurozone finds that allowing for imperfect intersectoral labour mobility signifi-
cantly improves the model fit to the data and adjusts the relative contribution of shocks to
the variability of observables. Posterior impulse response functions show that traded-sector
productivity shocks lead to an overall depreciation due to a strong countervailing terms of
trade effect despite rising non-traded goods prices.
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2.1 Introduction
What are the effects of changes in traded-sector productivity on the real exchange rate? In the presence
of non-traded goods, the textbook answer concerned with the long-run is given by Balassa (1964) and
Samuelson (1964) through the Balassa-Samuelson effect stating that positive productivity growth differ-
entials drive a real appreciation.1 Considering the dynamics of the real exchange rate in the short-run,
New Keynesian models on the other hand would suggest that at least traded goods prices fall in response
to traded-sector productivity shocks. This is because marginal costs decrease with higher productivity so
that firms lower their prices, implying a depreciation of the real exchange rate.2
In this paper, I analyse the role of labour mobility across production sectors in the context of a two-
country New Keynesian model of a monetary union and its implications for the dynamics of the real
exchange rate following sector-specific productivity shocks. A prior predictive analysis or model valida-
tion exercise in the spirit of Geweke (2007), Faust & Gupta (2012), and Leeper et al. (2017) shows how
probability bands of theoretical impulse response functions of the real exchange rate, the terms of trade,
and non-traded goods prices are affected by the degree of intersectoral labour market mobility.
I find that under perfect intersectoral labour mobility, traded-sector productivity shocks cannot lead
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate because of falling nominal wages and hence marginal costs
across both sectors. This is due to the standard feature in New Keynesian models that labour demand
and nominal wages fall in response to productivity shocks. Under perfect intersectoral labour mobility
and thus equal sector wages, the fall in nominal wages materialises symmetrically across both sectors. In
this respect, the model is irreconcilable with a Balassa-Samuelson rationale. When labour is not perfectly
mobile across sectors, traded-sector productivity shocks are shown to potentially produce an appreciation
of the real exchange rate through rising prices in the non-traded sector. This is because under imperfect
intersectoral labour mobility, the fall in nominal wages in the traded sector is not directly transmitted to
the non-traded sector, so that real labour income potentially increases, leading to a demand expansion and
thus rising prices for non-traded goods.
It is also emphasised that, irrespective of the specification of the labour market, under home bias the
terms of trade effect on the real exchange rate is negative. This is because given higher productivity, firms
in the traded sector lower their prices as marginal costs decline. The terms of trade necessarily increase
1Several papers acknowledge the contribution of Harrod (1933) and refer to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect. The observa-
tion of higher price levels in advanced economies can also be explained via demand instead of supply side factors as prescribed by
the Balassa-Samuelson theory. See for instance Bergstrand (1991) who proposes homothetic preferences where non-traded goods
are luxuries and traded goods necessities to explain higher price levels in rich countries.
2This is a general property of New Keynesian models that is robust to various model extensions.
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and hence favour a depreciation of the real exchange rate.3 Whether traded-sector productivity shocks
lead to an appreciation is thus the result of the response of non-traded goods prices and the countervailing
effect coming from the terms of trade. Nesting both perfect and imperfect intersectoral labour mobility
via a CES specification as in Horvath (2000) delivers testable restrictions for the parameters in a Bayesian
estimation of the model. This allows one to disentangle the effect of transitory traded-sector productivity
shocks on the real exchange rate.
Given the theoretical findings, the model is taken to the data to explain inflation and thus exchange
rate variability of Spain vis-à-vis the rest of the eurozone for the years 1996-2007. The results suggest
that labour is not perfectly mobile across sectors and that the model allowing for imperfect intersectoral
labour mobility provides a significantly improved fit to the data. Posterior impulse response functions
support a rise in non-traded goods prices following traded-sector productivity shocks that is outweighed
nonetheless by a strong terms of trade effect, leading to an overall depreciation of the real exchange rate.
The variance decomposition for the model allowing for imperfect intersectoral labour mobility assigns
less weight to traded-sector productivity shocks in driving inflation rate and exchange rate dynamics
and emphasises the role of demand disturbances in driving changes in the real exchange rate. These
results refine earlier findings by Rabanal (2009) and add to arguments by López-Salido et al. (2005), who
emphasised that demand factors are behind Spanish inflation dynamics.
Originally, the long-run theory sparked by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) aimed at explaining
high inflation rates in catching-up or developing economies. With rising inflation rate dispersion and
thus diverging real exchange rate dynamics since the introduction of the euro, as surveyed by De Haan
(2010), a vast array of economists has been investigating to what extent the Balassa-Samuelson effect
could have played a role within the European Monetary Union. This is because (i) the common currency
area delivers fertile ground to identify and test for a Balassa-Samuelson effect as nominal exchange rates
are fixed and (ii) at the same time rising inflation rate dispersion in the euro area poses a potential problem
for policy makers as monetary policy instruments are limited. If inflation rate differentials are persistent,
external competitiveness of the members of the currency union will necessarily diverge, leading to large
external imbalances. It has therefore been extensively discussed whether national fiscal authorities should
intervene and compress differences in inflation rates.4
Empirical support for the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis as an explanation of European real exchange
3This confirms earlier works dealing with the terms of trade in the context of the Balassa-Samuelson effect such as Choudhri &
Schembri (2010) and Bordo et al. (2017). See also Corsetti et al. (2007) and Corsetti et al. (2008) for the role of the terms of trade
in the international transmission of productivity shocks, however in the absence of non-traded goods.
4See for instance Beetsma & Jensen (2005), Kirsanova et al. (2007), Duarte & Wolman (2002), Duarte & Wolman (2008), and
the third essay of this dissertation.
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rate dynamics has been relatively weak.5 Most recently though, Berka et al. (2018) show for a panel of
nine eurozone countries from 1995-2009 that real exchange rate variations in the euro area have been
following the Balassa-Samuelson rationale if one controls for differences in unit labour costs. They
perform regressions on simulated data from a DSGE model of a two-country monetary union including
shocks to productivity as well as to the labour supply that confirm the empirical findings. Nevertheless,
their model does not allow to test for the presence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect via parameter restrictions
but can only replicate the empirical findings via the introduced shocks to the labour wedge. This paper
contributes to this strand of the literature by delivering testable parameter restrictions that allow to test for
the Balassa-Samuelson rationale in real exchange rate dynamics via a Bayesian estimation of the model.
Naturally, productivity shocks and the Balassa-Samuelson rationale should not be considered to be
the single source of real exchange rate variability. Besides demand-side effects as emphasised by López-
Salido et al. (2005), differences in market structures can, even under union-wide shocks, lead to a het-
erogeneous transmission and thus inflation differentials. These differences could materialise in product
and labour markets, as suggested by Angeloni & Ehrmann (2007), Andrés et al. (2008), Campolmi &
Faia (2011), Morsy & Jaumotte (2012), and Abbritti & Mueller (2013), as well as in financial markets,
as suggested by Hristov et al. (2014) and Gilchrist et al. (2017). These asymmetries lead to differing
inflationary processes that can be captured by different parameter estimates. A Bayesian estimation of a
structural two-country DSGE model allows one to evaluate the three main hypotheses – (i) supply side
factors (Balassa-Samuelson rationale), (ii) demand side factors, and (iii) market asymmetries – and anal-
yse their relative contribution to exchange rate dynamics in the recent past of the eurozone via variance
decompositions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model setup of the monetary union consisting
of two economies featuring two sectors of production. Section 2.3 analyses the model’s ability to deliver
testable restrictions for the Balassa-Samuelson effect through the conventional and terms of trade channel.
Section 2.4 analyses the sources of real exchange variability of Spain vis-à-vis the rest of the eurozone
via Bayesian estimation and variance decomposition. Section 2.5 concludes.
5A non-exhaustive list of works concerned with the core eurozone includes Ortega (2003), who illustrates that the lion’s share of
the relative appreciations vis-à-vis Germany were driven by non-traded goods prices while in the southern periphery this was due to
non-traded markups and wages, and Honohan & Lane (2003), who focus on Ireland and emphasise the channel of nominal effective
exchange rates. Moreover, Rabanal (2009) and López-Salido et al. (2005) focus on Spain, where the latter emphasise the channel
of demand biased towards non-traded goods and real wage rigidities. Angeloni & Ehrmann (2007) and Égert (2007) employ panel
regressions and conclude that demand and cost-push shocks were the main drivers of inflation differentials across the eurozone.
Contrarily, estimation results by Mihaljek & Klau (2008) suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson effect was a significant driving force
of inflation differentials of the CEE countries vis-à-vis the eurozone, which explains around a quarter of the observed variability.
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2.2 A two-sector, two-country model of a monetary union
The model largely follows the one presented in Rabanal (2009) and describes a monetary union consisting
of two countries each populated by a measure one of households that have access to an internationally
traded bond. A share 1 − n lives in the home economy (H), the remainder in the foreign economy (F).
Each economy produces traded (T ) and non-traded goods (N) of which the latter can only be consumed by
domestic households. Both economies feature nominal price rigidities in both sectors, and a centralised
monetary authority sets a union-wide nominal interest rate. There is no labour mobility across countries,
i.e. no migration.6 In contrast to Rabanal (2009), I employ a labour market specification that allows for
imperfect labour mobility across sectors but nests the setup of perfect labour mobility.
The setup of the home economy is presented in the following paragraphs. If not stated otherwise, the
setup of the foreign economy is equivalent. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
2.2.1 Households
Households maximise their expected lifetime utility,
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk [U(Ct+k) − V(Lt+k)] , (2.1)
derived from consumption, Ct, minus the disutility derived from supplying labour, Lt, to domestic firms.
The discount factor is denoted by β ∈ (0, 1). Consumption is composed of tradable, CT,t, and non-tradable,
CN,t, consumption goods via
Ct =
[
(1 − δ) 1ζ C
ζ−1
ζ
T,t + δ
1
ζ C
ζ−1
ζ
N,t
] ζ
ζ−1
, (2.2)
where ζ measures the substitutability between T and N goods and δ the steady-state share of N goods in
the consumption basket. The domestic consumer price level is given by
Pt =
[
(1 − δ)P1−ζT,t + δP1−ζN,t
] 1
1−ζ , (2.3)
where PT,t and PN,t denote the prices of T and N goods respectively. The optimal allocation of consump-
tion expenditures implies that CT,t = (1 − δ)
( PT,t
Pt
)−ζ
Ct and CN,t = δ
( PN,t
Pt
)−ζ
Ct.
The representative household supplies labour to both sectors earning the real wages wN,t and wT,t. I
6Labour mobility in Europe has increased but remains a much more muted adjustment channel than in the US, as highlighted by
Beyer & Smets (2015).
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follow the specification of Horvath (2000) so that hours supplied to the two sectors are aggregated via the
CES function,
Lt =
[
α1−γLγT,t + (1 − α)1−γLγN,t
] 1
γ , (2.4)
where 0 < α < 1 is the weight of hours supplied to the traded sector and 1/γ measures the substitutability
or mobility of hours worked across sectors.7 Barriers to labour mobility could be costs related to sector-
specific human capital, relocation or psychological costs due to shifting sectors.
The household maximises lifetime utility given the periodic budget constraint
Ct +
Bt
Pt
= Rt−1
Bt−1
Pt
+ wT,tLT,t + wN,tLN,t + Πt , (2.5)
where Bt denotes the internationally traded bond that yields the gross nominal interest rate, Rt, in t + 1
and Πt denotes profit transfers from domestic firms.8
The functional forms of utility read
U(Ct) = log(Ct − bCt−1) and (2.6)
V(Lt) =
1
1 + κ
L1+κt (2.7)
with the degree of internal habit expressed by b and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply by κ. The
optimal paths of consumption and hours supplied to the two sectors are described by the set of optimality
conditions of the utility maximisation problem. Besides the standard intertemporal Euler equation, one
can combine the sectoral labour supply conditions to obtain
wT,t
wN,t
=
(
α
1 − α
)1−γ ( LT,t
LN,t
)γ−1
, (2.8)
which summarises the versatility of the Horvath (2000) specification. The model nests the case of perfect
labour mobility and equal wages across sectors under γ = 1 and α = 0.5. While calibrations with α , 0.5
capture constant differences in real wages, the case of imperfect labour mobility when γ > 1 allows for
dynamic differences across sector wages. The prior predictive analysis will show that the specification
7An important assumption in the original Balassa-Samuselon theory is that of perfect labour mobility across sectors, implying
that relative wages should remain unchanged in repsonse to productivity differentials. Cardi & Restout (2015) show for a panel of
fourteen OECD countries that this prediction of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis does not hold in the data and suggest employing
the Horvath (2000) specification.
8The behaviour of the real exchange rate under complete financial markets would be close to identical in this model, as shown
in Chari et al. (2002). Thus, the results do not hinge on the assumption of incomplete financial markets.
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of the labour market is at the core of determining the model’s ability to replicate a Balassa-Samuelson
effect.
2.2.2 Firms
Intermediate-goods producers
In each sector there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], that set
their prices in a Calvo fashion with indexation, i.e. a fraction, µ, of firms that are unable to reoptimise
prices indexes their price to the previous period’s inflation rate. The firms produce intermediate-goods
varieties using a linear production technology and sector- and country-specific technology with ZS , where
S ∈ {T,N}.
In the non-tradable goods sector, an intermediate-goods firm i produces with
YN,t(i) = exp(ZN,t)LN,t(i) (2.9)
and seeks to maximise its expected profit given that with probability θN the firm is not able to adjust its
price, PN,t(i), in a given period. Formally, it sets its price to solve the problem
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θkN Qt,t+k
[
YN,t+k|t(i)PN,t(i) −WNt+kLN,t+k(i)
]
, (2.10)
where Qt,t+k = βk
U′(Ct+k)
U′(Ct)
Pt
Pt+k
is the stochastic discount factor, YN,t+k|t(i) the output of firm i in t + k given
the price set in t, i.e. YN,t+k|t(i) =
( PN,t(i)
PN,t+k
( PN,t+k−1
PN,t−1
)µN )−ϵ
YN,t+k, and WNt the nominal wage paid in that sector.
µN denotes the share of indexing firms.
The setup and maximisation problem of an intermediate-goods producer in the traded sector is anal-
ogous. Intermediate goods in the traded sector in the home economy are produced by firm i via the
production function
YH,t(i) = exp(ZT,t)LT,t(i) . (2.11)
Firm i in the tradable sector sets its price, PH,t(i), to maximise
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θkH Qt,t+k
[
YH,t+k|t(i)PH,t(i) −WTt+kLT,t+k(i)
]
, (2.12)
where with probability θH the firm in the traded sector cannot readjust its price and given demand
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YH,t+k|t(i) =
( PH,t(i)
PH,t+k
( PH,t+k−1
PH,t−1
)µH )−ϵ
YH,t+k. The share of indexing firms is denoted by µH .
The sector-technologies are assumed to follow AR(1) processes of the form
ZN,t = ρZN ZN,t−1 + ϵZN ,t and (2.13)
ZT,t = ρZT ZT,t−1 + ϵZT ,t + ϵT,t . (2.14)
Innovations ϵZS ,t are uncorrelated across sectors and countries. ϵT,t denotes an area-wide i.i.d. technology
innovation in the traded sector.
Retailers
Retailers in both sectors are perfectly competitive and combine intermediate goods to produce the final
good to be sold to the household. The final non-traded good, YN,t, is produced with technology YN,t =(∫ 1
0 YN,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, where ϵ is the elasticity of substitution across different varieties, YN,t(i), of the non-
tradable intermediate good. Given the technology, retailers in the non-traded sector maximise their profit
max PN,tYN,t −
∫ 1
0
PN,t(i)YN,t(i)di (2.15)
which yields the demand function
YN,t(i) =
(
PN,t(i)
PN,t
)−ϵ
YN,t , (2.16)
where PN,t(i) is the price for variety i of the non-traded good and PN,t =
(∫ 1
0 PN,t(i)
1−ϵdi
) 1
1−ϵ
.
In the traded sector, retailers combine intermediate home- and foreign-produced traded goods, YH,t(i)
and YF,t(i), to produce the final traded good, YT,t, consumed by domestic households. They choose their
inputs to maximise
max PT,tYT,t −
∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)YH,t(i)di −
∫ 1
0
PF,t(i)YF,t(i)di (2.17)
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subject to technologies
YT,t =
[
(1 − ω) 1φ Y
φ−1
φ
H,t + ω
1
φ Y
φ−1
φ
F,t
] φ
φ−1
, (2.18)
YH,t =
(∫ 1
0
YH,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, and (2.19)
YF,t =
(∫ 1
0
YF,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, (2.20)
where φ is the elasticity of substitution between final home and foreign traded goods in the production
of YT,t and ω stands for the steady-state share of imported goods in the final traded good. Home bias for
home-produced traded goods is present when ω < 0.5.9 Profit maximisation yields the demand functions
YdH,t(i) = (1 − ω)
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ϵ (PH,t
PT,t
)−φ
YT,t and (2.21)
YdF,t(i) = ω
(
PF,t(i)
PF,t
)−ϵ (PF,t
PT,t
)−φ
YT,t , (2.22)
where PH,t(i) and PF,t(i) are the prices of the home and foreign traded variety i and where the price indices
are defined as PH,t =
(∫ 1
0 PH,t(i)
1−ϵ
) 1
1−ϵ
, PF,t =
(∫ 1
0 PF,t(i)
1−ϵ
) 1
1−ϵ
, and PT,t =
[
(1 − ω)P1−φH,t + ωP1−φF,t
] 1
1−φ .
Terms of trade and the real exchange rate
Due to the presence of the non-traded goods sector, the model includes external and internal terms of
trade. The (external) terms of trade, Tt, are defined as the price of foreign-produced traded goods relative
to home-produced traded goods, i.e.
Tt =
PF,t
PH,t
. (2.23)
A rise in the terms of trade ameliorates the external competitiveness of the home economy as the foreign-
produced traded goods become relatively more expensive.
The internal terms of trade, TN,t, are defined as
TN,t =
PN,t
PT,t
and (2.24)
T ∗N,t =
P∗N,t
P∗T,t
(2.25)
9Analogously, foreign bias is implied by setting ω > 0.5.
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and measure the internal competitiveness across sectors within a country. They capture the price of the
non-traded good relative to the final traded good within a member country of the monetary union.
The real exchange rate, rer, is defined as
rer =
Pt
P∗t
=
PT,t
P∗T,t
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1 − δ + δT 1−ζN,t1 − δ + δT ∗1−ζN,t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1
1−ζ
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ (1 − ω)Tφ−1t + ω
(1 − ω) + ωTφ−1t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1
1−φ
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ 1 − δ + δT 1−ζN,t1 − δ + δT ∗1−ζN,t
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
1
1−ζ
, (2.26)
which is a function of external and domestic and foreign internal terms of trade. Given the definition, an
appreciation (depreciation) of the real exchange rate is shown by an increase (fall) in rer, i.e. the home
economy’s price level, P, increases (falls) relative to the foreign economy’s price level, P∗.
In the textbook Balassa-Samuelson effect, traded goods prices would be identical (PT,t = P∗T,t) so that
changes in the real exchange rate are entirely driven by differences in non-traded goods prices. A rise in
non-traded goods prices leads to an appreciation (or rise) of the real exchange rate via the rise in TN , i.e.
the domestic price level, P, rises relative to the foreign, P∗. By allowing for different traded goods prices
via home or foreign bias, the model is able to capture changes in the real exchange rate through changes
in the terms of trade. In the absence of non-traded goods (δ = 0), changes in the real exchange rate are
entirely driven by the terms of trade.
2.2.3 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is conducted at the union level and responds to average union-wide consumer price
inflation πUt = (πt)
1−n(π∗t )n. The Taylor-type interest rate rule reads
Rt =
(
1
β
)1−ρR
(Rt−1)ρR
(
πUt
)(1−ρR)ϕ
exp(ϵM,t) , (2.27)
where ρR denotes the interest rate persistence and ϕ the aggressiveness with which the central bank reacts
to union-wide consumer price inflation. ϵR,t denotes i.i.d. monetary policy disturbances.
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2.2.4 Market clearing
The market clearing conditions for traded and non-traded goods, the labour market, and the international
bond market are
YT,t = CT,t +GT,t , (2.28)
YN,t = CN,t +GN,t and (2.29)
(1 − n) Bt
Pt
= n
B∗t
P∗t
, (2.30)
where GT and GN are sector-specific demand disturbances following AR(1) processes that read
GT,t = ρGT GT,t−1 + ϵGT ,t and (2.31)
GN,t = ρGN GN,t−1 + ϵGN ,t . (2.32)
Innovations ϵGT ,t and ϵGN ,t are i.i.d. and uncorrelated across sectors. A debt-elastic interest rate à la
Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003) induces debt-stationarity.
2.3 Prior analysis: The role of intersectoral labour mobility
I perform a prior predictive analysis in order to determine the role of intersectoral labour mobility for
real exchange rate dynamics after shocks to traded-sector productivity.10 I do so by simulating the model
and computing prior impulse response functions for the real exchange rate, the external terms of trade,
and non-traded goods prices given relatively agnostic priors for parameters that would be included in a
Bayesian estimation. I compare probability bands of impulse response functions for the perfect labour
mobility model (PLM) with those of the model nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) via the Horvath
(2000) specification.
2.3.1 Approach
I compute the range of prior impulse response functions, i.e. impulse response functions that the model
can produce given calibration and prior range of parameters of interest. I compare two model versions:
the perfect labour mobility model (PLM), which calibrates α and γ to 0.5 and 1 respectively, and the
10This approach is inspired by Leeper et al. (2017), who show how the size of estimated fiscal multipliers is heavily model-
dependant. They find that only by including government consumption in the household’s utility function and by varying the
parameter governing the degree of substitutability or complementarity of public to private consumption is the model able to produce
a respectable range of fiscal multipliers.
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nesting perfect labour mobility model (NPLM), in which α and γ can take a range of values to allow for
imperfect labour mobility. I proceed in three steps:
1. Given the model structure, M ∈ {PLM,NPLM}, I specify prior density functions, p(θM), for the
model parameters θM . Parameters that are weakly identified or have clear empirical counterparts
are assigned point priors, i.e. they are calibrated.
2. Together with the parameter priors, the linearly approximated model delivers ex ante distributions
for the model’s observables, yt, from p(yt) =
∫
p(θM)p(yt |θM)dθM .
3. The prior predictive analysis draws from θM ∼ p(θM) and yt ∼ p(yt |θM) and computes impulse
response functions for yt given prior draws.
This approach allows to investigate to what extent the transmission of sector-specific productivity shocks
to the real exchange rate is affected by the degree of labour mobility. In general, it should be expected
that probability bands around prior impulse response functions in the NPLM model should be broader, as
it nests the model responses produced in the PLM model.
2.3.2 Calibration and priors
The baseline calibration is for two symmetric countries of equal size. The calibration is summarised in
Table 2.1 and mainly follows Duarte & Wolman (2008). Because the steady-state share of non-traded
Description Parameter Value
Size of the home economy 1 − n 0.5
Discount factor β 0.99
Inverse Frisch elasticity κ 1
Steady-state share of N goods δ 0.4
Steady-state import share in T good ω 0.4
Elasticity of substitution between T and N goods ζ 0.74
Elasticity of substitution between H and F goods φ 1.5
Elasticity of substitution across goods varieties ϵ 10
Weight on LT in CES α 0.5
Inverse elasticity of substitution between T and N hours γ 1
Note: α and γ are only calibrated for the perfect labour mobility (PLM) model.
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
goods as well as the steady-state import share would be calibrated in an explicit application to a certain
country, they are fixed in the prior predictive analysis. Depending on goods classification schemes, the
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share of non-tradable goods ranges from approximately 40% to 60% across European economies.11 Cali-
brating δ to 0.4 hence represents the lower bound for changes in the real exchange rate caused by changes
in the internal terms of trade. A steady-state import share of 0.4 implies a small degree of home bias,
allowing for price differentials due to differences in traded goods prices. Again, this calibration should
be seen as a lower bound to allow changes in the real exchange rate to be driven by the (external) terms
of trade. Importantly, the baseline calibration fixes the parameters α and γ to 0.5 and 1 respectively,
corresponding to equal sector wages and perfect labour mobility in the PLM model.
The priors follow standard ranges and distributions from the existing literature, in particular the study
by Rabanal (2009), and are displayed in Table 2.2. As changes in the real exchange rate for two countries
in a monetary union are reflected by price changes and hence differing inflation rates, parameters linked
to price setting by firms are of major interest, i.e. Calvo parameters and the shares of indexing firms.
Additionally, the responsiveness and persistence of the nominal interest rate exert significant influence on
Description Parameter Distribution Mean Std. Dev.
Calvo parameter θN , θN∗ , θH , θF Beta 0.75 0.15
Indexation µN , µN∗ , µH , µF Beta 0.6 0.2
Habit persistence b Normal 0.5 0.1
Monetary policy strength ϕ Normal 1.5 0.1
Interest rate rule persistence ρR Beta 0.7 0.1
Weight on LT in CES α Normal 0.5 0.1
Inverse elasticity of subst. between T and N hours γ Uniform 5.5 9/
√
12
Note: α and γ are calibrated to 0.5 and 1 respectively in the perfect labour mobility (PLM) model.
Table 2.2: Priors
inflation dynamics and are thus given some range. In the NPLM model, I allow for imperfect intersectoral
labour mobility by setting a uniform prior for the inverse elasticity of substitution between hours supplied
to the two sectors, γ, ranging from 1 (perfect labour mobility) to 10 (considerable degree of intersectoral
immobility). The prior for the weight of LT in the CES aggregator, α, is set to a normal distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1.
2.3.3 Results
For the analysis, I generate 100,000 draws from the prior distributions and compute impulse response
functions at each draw for the two different model versions, perfect labour mobility (PLM) and nesting
11See also Stockman & Tesar (1995) who show that for OECD countries non-traded goods account for around 50% of total
consumption.
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perfect labour mobility (NPLM). The following graphs display the mean response and 90% probability
bands for the computed prior impulse response functions given the priors reported in Table 2.2. The
analysis focuses on the response of the real exchange rate, the external terms of trade, and non-traded
goods price levels to a one standard deviation increase in traded-sector technology.12
To begin with, Figure 2.1 displays the mean impulse response function and 90% probability bands for
the external terms of trade and the non-traded goods price level for the PLM model and the NPLM model.
Both models yield an increase in external competitiveness, T , following the traded-sector technology
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Figure 2.1: Prior mean impulse response functions and 90% probability bands for external terms of
trade, T , and non-traded goods prices, PN , in the perfect labour mobility (PLM) and nesting perfect
labour mobility (NPLM) model
shock which supports a depreciation of the real exchange rate. In New Keynesian models, firms set
12Note that for this exercise, I calibrate the traded-sector technology shock persistence, ρZT , to 0.7 to focus on the transmission
mechanism of the model.
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prices with a markup over marginal costs. As marginal costs in the traded sector decrease, firms seek to
lower their prices. Irrespective of the degree of intersectoral labour mobility, domestic firms producing
traded goods will lower their prices, PH , so that the external terms of trade will unambiguously increase,
favouring a depreciation of the real exchange rate under home bias.
Inspecting price level responses of non-traded goods shows an unambiguous fall of non-traded goods
prices in the PLM model. This is because of the common wage structure under perfect intersectoral labour
mobility. In a New Keynesian model, an increase in technology leads undoubtedly to a fall in the labour
demand of firms.13 In the specific example of a traded-sector technology shock, firms in the traded sector
reduce their labour demand, which leads to a fall in the nominal wage paid in that sector. Under perfect
labour mobility and equal sector wages, firms in the non-traded sector also pay lower wages, reducing
their marginal costs and allowing them to lower their prices. When labour is not perfectly mobile, the
link between sector wages is broken and sector-specific shocks can trigger asymmetric responses within
the economy, as non-traded goods prices can rise with higher traded-sector productivity, as shown by the
probability bands of impulse response functions of the non-traded goods price level in the NPLM model.
Finally, Figure 2.2 shows that the potential rise in non-traded goods prices in the NPLM model can
outweigh the terms of trade effect and produce an appreciation of the real exchange rate. In the PLM
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Figure 2.2: Prior mean impulse response functions and 90% probability bands for the real exchange rate,
rer, in the perfect labour mobility (PLM) and nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) model
model, the change in the real exchange rate is undoubtedly negative as a result of i) the terms of trade
effect and ii) the transmitted fall in non-traded goods prices through perfect intersectoral labour mobility.
The NPLM model, on the other hand, delivers a more agnostic image. While the mean impulse response
13This result is robust to the inclusion of capital as well as to the size of the home economy within the union.
25
function shows a fall in the real exchange rate on impact, the probability bands reveal the greater flexibility
of the model relative to a setting with perfect labour mobility. Most importantly, the level of the real
exchange rate can rise as well as fall in response to the traded-sector technology shock at various time
horizons.
This analysis shows that the degree of labour mobility across sectors is decisive for real exchange rate
dynamics following sector-specific shocks. In particular, the assumption of perfect intersectoral labour
mobility prevents a two-sector model of a two-country monetary union from replicating higher prices
in the non-traded sector due to higher productivity in the traded sector, irrespective of the information
contained in the data. The specification of V(LT,t, LN,t) and the estimation of the nesting parameters, α and
γ, that determine the degree of labour mobility across sectors deliver testable restrictions in the context
of a Bayesian estimation.14 As a result, the model allows to test for a Balassa-Samuelson rationale in
the short-run, i.e. rising prices in the non-traded sector due to a positive productivity shock in the traded
sector.15
2.4 Application: Inflation variability in Spain
After a period of great price level convergence in the late ’90s, inflation rate dispersion within the eu-
rozone increased significantly with the introduction of the euro, as surveyed by De Haan (2010).16 One
particularly interesting case is that of Spain. From the late ’90s up until the global financial crisis (GFC),
Spanish consumer price inflation exceeded the euro area average by a persistently large amount as dis-
played in Figure 2.3.
It is evident that inflation rates in the services component of the Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP), serving as a proxy for non-traded goods, had a significant impact on aggregate inflation
dynamics. With very few exceptions, inflation differentials in the services component have been at least
as high as aggregate differentials, indicating that a large amount of the relative appreciation of Spain has
been driven by trends in the non-traded sector. In terms of dynamics on the other hand, the series exhibits
a positive correlation of 0.35. This does not, however, allow one to draw concrete conclusions regarding
how price dynamics in the non-traded sector affected the real exchange rate over the considered time
horizon.
In this section and in line with the previous prior analysis, I want to focus on the drivers of exchange
14The identification analysis following Ratto & Iskrev (2011) supports the identification of both α and γ.
15In contrast, Berka et al. (2018) relied on the inclusion of shocks to the labour wedge to reconcile a New Keynesian DSGE
model with a Balassa-Samuelson effect.
16See Rogers (2007), who argues that price levels within the EMU did already converge prior to the introduction of the euro to a
comparable level, as can be observed across the states of the U.S.A.
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Figure 2.3: Quarterly HICP inflation differentials of Spain vis-à-vis the EA18 (excluding Spain),
1996Q2-2007Q4. Source: Eurostat.
rate variability instead of long-run trends, i.e. I disregard differences in mean inflation rates between
Spain and the rest of the eurozone. I do so because the particularly persistent differences in inflation
rates between Spain and those of the rest of the eurozone cannot be explained by temporary shocks, but
are most likely related to differences in steady-state growth rates of productivity and the like. I seek to
compare my estimation results to those of Rabanal (2009), who estimated the perfect labour mobility
model and allowed for deterministic growth rates in productivity to capture the mean differences.
For the variability of inflation rates, the estimation allows the nesting of three potential drivers: i)
supply side factors (Balassa-Samuelson rationale), ii) demand factors, and iii) heterogeneity in markets
captured by different inflationary processes. By estimating the nesting perfect labour mobility model
and comparing it to the results of the perfect labour mobility model, I am able to assess the relative
importance of imperfect intersectoral labour mobility to disentangle these drivers of inflation variability
of Spain. Moreover, it allows me to re-evaluate whether traded-sector productivity shocks in Spain could
have had a positive effect on non-traded goods prices, as would be predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson
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rationale yet was rejected by Rabanal (2009).17
2.4.1 Data and priors
I use the same data and priors as Rabanal (2009) for the same time period of 1996Q2 to 2007Q4.18 I esti-
mate the perfect labour mobility (PLM) and the nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) models presented
in Section 2.2. I do so using standard Bayesian techniques as discussed by Smets & Wouters (2003) and
An & Schorfheide (2007) to evaluate the likelihood function and simulate the posterior distributions of
the model parameters. I use 400,000 draws and let the first 120,000 draws be burn-in.
The data is available on Eurostat and includes quarterly data on aggregate and services HICP inflation
and real GDP growth rates for Spain and the rest of the EMU. The rest of the EMU comprises the euro
area 18 (EA18) excluding Spain. As the monetary policy rate, I use the 3-month T-bill rate of the euro
area. As my focus is on the dynamics of the real exchange rate rather than constant differences due to
potentially different long-run trends in productivity and the like, the data is demeaned to match the zero
mean growth rates of the linearised model.
Parameters are calibrated as shown in Table 2.1 with two exceptions. The size of the home economy,
Spain, is set to 0.11, representing the average weight of Spain in the HICP of the EMU, and habit per-
sistence is fixed to 0.5.19 The prior distributions mirror those of Rabanal (2009) with the exception that
for the NPLM model the priors for α and γ from Table 2.2 are included.20 In the PLM model, α is set to
0.5 and γ equal to one. The estimates of these two parameters in the NPLM model will shed light on the
degree of labour mobility across sectors and to what extent sector-specific disturbances will affect sectors
asymmetrically.
2.4.2 Results
The key estimation results are presented in Table 2.3 and compare posterior distributions for the PLM
and NPLM model.21 Overall, posterior estimates of the structural parameters do not differ greatly across
17A variance decomposition and analysis of posterior impulse response functions led Rabanal (2009) to the conclusion that ‘the
Balassa-Samuelson effect does not appear to be an important driver of the inflation differential during the EMU period’ for Spain
because of a predicted fall in non-traded inflation in response to traded-sector productivity shocks. The variance decomposition he
performed suggests that Spanish inflation variability was mostly driven by productivity shocks while output variability was mainly
affected by demand disturbances.
18A summary can be found in Table 2.A1 in Appendix A.
19The identification analysis following Ratto & Iskrev (2011) suggests that the parameter governing habit is relatively weakly
identified, which is why it is fixed to the mean of the prior analysis in Section 2.3. The results are not significantly affected if the
calibration is changed.
20The prior distributions are summarised in table 2.A2 in Appendix A.
21A full table of the posterior results can be found in Table 2.A3 in Appendix A. Prior and posterior densities are displayed in
Figures 2.B1 and 2.B2 in Appendix B.
28
the two models and confirm many earlier findings in the literature and those of Rabanal (2009). Calvo
parameter estimates in the traded sector imply relatively flexible prices compared to the non-traded sector
in both countries. Furthermore, as in Rabanal (2009), prices are less rigid in Spain than in the rest of the
eurozone across both sectors. The degree of backward-looking behaviour in the Phillips curve measured
by indexation is relatively low but estimated to be slightly higher in the PLM model.
Parameter NPLM PLM Parameter NPLM PLM
θH 0.18 0.20 µH 0.44 0.51
(0.08-0.28) (0.10-0.30) (0.12-0.74) (0.17-0.87)
θF 0.32 0.29 µF 0.37 0.45
(0.20-0.44) (0.17-0.42) (0.08-0.64) (0.11-0.79)
θN 0.75 0.66 µN 0.22 0.22
(0.67-0.83) (0.57-0.75) (0.03-0.39) (0.04-0.38)
θN∗ 0.88 0.83 µN∗ 0.27 0.44
(0.85-0.91) (0.79-0.88) (0.07-0.47) (0.15-0.72)
α 0.63 0.5 σ(ϵT ) 0.27 0.39
(0.48-0.78) - (0.18-0.38) (0.24-0.53)
γ 2.33 1 σ(ϵZT ) 0.54 0.71
(1.75-2.94) - (0.39-0.67) (0.53-0.90)
σ(ϵZN ) 0.81 0.69 σ(ϵZ∗T ) 0.25 0.32
(0.45-1.19) (0.43-0.94) (0.15-0.36) (0.16-0.47)
σ(ϵZ∗N ) 0.77 0.70
(0.41-1.10) (0.47-0.93)
Log-L 18.22 -17.00
Note: For each parameter I report the estimated posterior mean and 90% interval (in brackets) in the perfect labour mobility (PLM)
and nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) model. The log-likelihood is based on the harmonic mean estimator.
Table 2.3: Key posterior distributions - Spain and rest of the EMU
The estimates for the parameters governing the degree of labour mobility, α and γ, suggest that labour
is indeed not perfectly mobile across sectors. While the credible set of the weight of hours dedicated
to the traded sector, α, still includes the PLM model value of 0.5, the estimate for the inverse elasticity
of substitution of hours across sectors, γ, clearly rejects the hypothesis of perfect labour mobility across
sectors (γ = 1), despite a very agnostic prior.
Estimated variances for traded-sector technology shocks are higher in the PLM model, while vari-
ances of non-traded-sector technology shocks are slightly lower. This should be due to the fact that the
NPLM allows an asymmetric transmission of sector-specific productivity disturbances so that the rel-
ative size of sector-specific disturbances changes. The results in Table 2.3 suggest that in the NPLM,
traded-sector productivity disturbances are relatively smaller compared to those in the non-traded sector.
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The NPLM model clearly outperforms the PLM model in terms of fitting the data. The log Bayes
factor, equal to the difference of the log-likelihoods of the two models, gives an indication as to which
model is more strongly supported by the data. A log Bayes factor of about 35 heavily favours the NPLM
model; in other words, allowing for imperfect labour mobility across sectors implies a much better fit to
the data than restricting labour mobility to being perfect.
Figure 2.4 displays the posterior mean impulse responses of the real exchange rate and the price level
of non-traded goods to a traded-sector productivity shock for the PLM (light grey) and NPLM (dark grey)
model. At the posterior mean, the NPLM model predicts a rise in non-traded goods prices following an
increase in traded-sector productivity, supporting a Balassa-Samuelson rationale, while the PLM model,
unsurprisingly, predicts a fall in non-traded goods prices.22
At the posterior mean, a rise in traded-sector productivity in the NPLM model leads to a fall in
traded-labour demand and the associated nominal wages. However, prices for traded goods drop as
marginal costs fall so that overall real wages increase with the rise in productivity. Real labour income
increases overall at the posterior mean estimates so that households seek to increase their consumption
– in particular their consumption of the relatively cheap traded good. However, as final traded and non-
traded goods are imperfectly substitutable, households also increase their demand for non-traded goods.
Non-traded goods producers demand more labour, their marginal costs increase with production and non-
traded goods prices increase. With equal sector wages, as in the PLM model, non-traded nominal wages
would have fallen in line with nominal traded-sector wages and would thus not have led to a rise in
marginal costs justifying higher non-traded goods prices.
However, this increase in non-traded goods prices in the NPLM model does not lead to an appreciation
of the real exchange rate. In fact, the response of the real exchange rate to the traded-sector productivity
shock is close to identical across the PLM and NPLM models and differs only in the response of non-
traded goods prices. The depreciation in the NPLM model is the result of a strong terms of trade effect that
outweighs the rise in non-traded goods prices. As discussed in the prior analysis, the terms of trade effect,
which is roughly identical across the two models, favours a depreciation under home bias, as firms in the
traded sector will always lower their prices in response to an increase in productivity and a decline in their
marginal costs. Since the posterior estimate in the NPLM model for the elasticity of substitution of hours
worked across sectors, γ, is still relatively close to one, the rise in non-traded goods prices is not strong
enough to outweigh the terms of trade effect in the NPLM model. This leads to an overall depreciation
22The credible sets of posterior impulse responses of the PLM model include some positive responses of the price level of
non-traded goods. This is because of the estimated potential high persistence of the traded-sector productivity shock given by the
credible set in Table 2.A3 in Appendix A. As productivity shocks become close to permanent, the New Keynesian feature of sticky
prices becomes irrelevant as we approach a classic long-run perspective in which price levels are higher where productivity levels
are higher.
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Figure 2.4: Posterior mean impulse response functions and 90% credible sets for a one standard
deviation increase in traded-sector technology of the real exchange rate and the non-traded goods price
level in Spain based on the PLM (light grey) and NPLM (dark grey) model
of the real exchange rate following the traded-sector productivity shock that is close to identical to the
response in the PLM model.
These results stand in stark contrast to the conclusion of Rabanal (2009) that the ‘Balassa-Samuelson
effect fails to hold’. His posterior impulse response functions for the response of inflation in the non-
traded sector to traded-sector productivity shocks clearly implied falling prices in the non-traded sector.
As established in the prior analysis in Section 2.3, this has been the result of allowing for perfect labour
mobility across sectors. While the overall effect on the real exchange rate remains negative across the two
sectors, the NPLM model uncovers that non-traded goods prices do increase with traded-sector technol-
ogy shocks mirroring a Balassa-Samuelson rationale.
Finally, key results of the variance decomposition of the observables are reported in Table 2.4.23 It
reports the differences in the contribution of shocks of the NPLM relative to the PLM; a negative value
of x implies that the PLM model overestimates the contribution of that shock by x percentage points, as
in the NPLM model the estimate is x percentage points lower. Note that country-specific shocks include
domestic as well as foreign shocks that could potentially spill over to the other economy.
Allowing for imperfect intersectoral labour mobility adjusts in particular entries related to traded-
sector technology shocks. Note that for aggregate country inflation rates and in particular the inflation
differential, i.e. the change in the real exchange rate, country-specific traded-sector technology shocks
contribute significantly less to the observed variability. This is in line with relatively smaller estimates of
23The full set of variance decompositions for the two models can be found in Table 2.A4 in Appendix A.
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Country-specific shocks Area-wide shocks
Technology Demand
Tradable Nontradable Tradable Nontradable Technology Monetary
π -8.36 -4.30 20.98 -1.26 1.04 -8.08
πN 0.65 -5.94 2.54 8.98 1.18 -7.14
π∗ -2.07 -3.07 25.56 -1.62 -2.4 -16.40
π∗N 0.67 -4.04 5.51 2.12 4.85 -9.11
∆Y -14.55 -2.99 21.62 -2.11 -2.13 0.18
∆YN 0.59 4.29 1.15 -10.24 0.09 4.12
π − π∗ -16.62 -10.5 30.26 -3.09 0.08 -0.23
Note: Variance decomposition based on the parameter estimates of the nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) and the perfect
labour mobility (PLM) model
Table 2.4: Differences between the variance decomposition of the NPLM and the PLM model (in
percentage points) - Spain and the rest of the EMU
the variances of traded-sector productivity reported in Table 2.3. In the NPLM model, these variables are
more significantly driven by demand disturbances in the traded sector, which contradicts the findings of
Rabanal (2009) but strengthens the argument by López-Salido et al. (2005) that demand disturbances are
responsible for Spanish inflation rates.24
Variability of non-traded inflation remains predominantly driven by non-traded productivity shocks,
but the NPLM model assigns a higher weight to demand disturbances. Also, for aggregate output vari-
ability in Spain, a higher weight is assigned to demand disturbances relative to supply side factors. The
opposite holds true for the variability of services GDP. Although more than 76% of the variability is still
explained by non-traded demand disturbances, there is slightly more weight on non-traded technology
shocks and monetary policy shocks.
Overall, the variance decomposition confirms the majority of Rabanal’s (2009) findings but refines
the relative contribution of shocks. First, technology shocks play a less decisive role for the variability
of aggregate and non-traded inflation in both Spain and the rest of the EMU. Second, the contribution of
demand disturbances to the variability of real exchange rate dynamics is significantly underestimated by
more than 27% in the PLM model. Third, output variability remains mainly driven by demand distur-
bances as suggested by Rabanal (2009). However, while the PLM model underestimates the contribution
of traded demand disturbances to aggregate output variability in Spain, the impact of non-traded demand
disturbances on services GDP in Spain is slightly overestimated.
This section has shown that allowing for imperfect intersectoral labour mobility and the estimation
24This comparison should be taken with some caution, as López-Salido et al. (2005) consider a different time horizon and are
predominantly concerned with the persistent differences in inflation rates rather than dynamics.
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of nesting parameters i) delivers a significantly improved model-fit to the data, ii) uncovers a distinct
asymmetric transmission mechanism of sector-specific productivity shocks, and iii) considerably corrects
the relative contribution of shocks to the variability in observables.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the degree of intersectoral labour mobility is decisive for the transmission of
sector-specific productivity disturbances and their effects on the real exchange rate. In particular, traded-
sector productivity shocks necessarily lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate under perfect labour
mobility across sectors. This is because in New Keynesian models, labour demand falls in response to
positive productivity shocks. When traded-sector productivity increases, firms in that sector lower their
labour demand, leading to a fall in the economy-wide wage under equal sector wages due to perfect labour
mobility. This causes marginal costs and hence prices to fall in the non-traded sector, which contradicts
the rationale of a Balassa-Samuelson effect. Allowing for imperfect intersectoral labour mobility via
a CES specification following Horvath (2000) enables the model to induce an appreciation of the real
exchange rate due to an increase in non-traded goods prices. The parameters governing the degree of
labour mobility deliver testable parameter restrictions for a Bayesian estimation of the model.
The application to Spanish inflation variability relative to the rest of the eurozone up to the GFC
clearly rejects the hypothesis of perfect labour mobility across sectors. Impulse response functions at
the posterior mean suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson rationale holds, i.e. that non-traded goods prices
respond positively to traded-sector productivity shocks. Only a strong terms of trade effect hinders the
rise in non-traded goods prices to lead to an overall appreciation. Comparing variance decompositions
of the nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) and the perfect labour mobility (PLM) model shows that
in the PLM model, the impact of technology (demand) shocks on inflation rate variability is significantly
overestimated (underestimated). The conclusion by Rabanal (2009) that output variability was mainly
driven by demand disturbances generally holds true.
Movements in the real exchange rate are a natural response to country-specific disturbances in a
regime of fixed nominal exchange rates. A better understanding of the sources of those dynamics is of
high interest to academics as well as policy makers. The analysis in this paper delivers a refined picture
of the contribution of demand and supply disturbances to real exchange rate dynamics. In light of the
ongoing debate concerning how much regional policy intervention is needed within the eurozone, the
results from this analysis help to inform about potential fiscal targets or instruments that should be used
for regional stabilisation.
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2.A Appendix - Tables
Observable variable Model counterpart
HICP inflation Spain πt
Services inflation Spain πN,t
HICP inflation rest of EMU π∗t
Services inflation rest of EMU π∗N,t
Real GDP growth Spain ∆Yt
Services real GDP growth Spain ∆YN,t
Real GDP growth rest of EMU ∆Y∗t
Services real GDP growth rest of EMU ∆Y∗N,t
3-month T-bill rate Rt
Note: The rest of the EMU comprises the euro area 18 excluding Spain. Data source: Eurostat.
Table 2.A1: Data
Description Parameter Distribution Mean Std. Dev.
Calvo parameter θN , θN∗ , θH , θF Beta 0.75 0.15
Indexation µN , µN∗ , µH , µF Beta 0.6 0.2
Monetary policy strength ϕ Normal 1.5 0.1
Interest rate rule persistence ρR Beta 0.7 0.1
Technology shock persistence ρZT , ρZN Beta 0.7 0.1
Demand shock persistence ρGT , ρGN Beta 0.7 0.1
Std. dev. technology shocks in % σ(ϵZS ), σ(ϵT ) Gamma 0.7 0.1
Std. dev. demand shocks in % σ(ϵGS ) Gamma 1 0.5
Std. dev. monetary shocks in % σ(ϵM) Gamma 0.4 0.2
Weight on LT in CES α Normal 0.5 0.1
Inverse elasticity of subst. between T and N hours γ uniform 5.5 9/
√
12
Note: Parameters α and γ are calibrated to 0.5 and 1 respectively in the perfect labour mobility (PLM) model. S ∈ {T,N,T ∗,N∗}.
Table 2.A2: Priors - Spain and rest of the EMU
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Parameter NPLM PLM Parameter NPLM PLM
θH 0.18 0.20 µH 0.44 0.51
(0.08-0.28) (0.10-0.30) (0.12-0.74) (0.17-0.87)
θF 0.32 0.29 µF 0.37 0.45
(0.20-0.44) (0.17-0.42) (0.08-0.64) (0.11-0.79)
θN 0.75 0.66 µN 0.22 0.22
(0.67-0.83) (0.57-0.75) (0.03-0.39) (0.04-0.38)
θN∗ 0.88 0.83 µN∗ 0.27 0.44
(0.85-0.91) (0.79-0.88) (0.07-0.47) (0.15-0.72)
ρR 0.65 0.68 ϕ 1.47 1.52
(0.58-0.72) (0.59-0.76) (1.31-1.63) (1.36-1.68)
α 0.63 0.5 σ(ϵM) 0.14 0.14
(0.48-0.78) - (0.09-0.14) (0.10-0.19)
γ 2.33 1 σ(ϵT ) 0.27 0.39
(1.75-2.94) - (0.18-0.38) (0.24-0.53)
ρZT 0.86 0.82 σ(ϵZT ) 0.54 0.71
(0.79-0.93) (0.71-0.94) (0.39-0.67) (0.53-0.90)
ρZN 0.73 0.79 σ(ϵZN ) 0.81 0.69
(0.61-0.84) (0.69-0.90) (0.45-1.19) (0.43-0.94)
ρGT 0.79 0.79 σ(ϵZ∗T ) 0.25 0.32
(0.74-0.85) (0.73-0.86) (0.15-0.36) (0.16-0.47)
ρGN 0.88 0.88 σ(ϵZ∗N ) 0.77 0.70
(0.84-0.93) (0.84-0.93) (0.41-1.10) (0.47-0.93)
σ(ϵGT ) 0.39 0.39 σ(ϵGN ) 0.19 0.21
(0.29-0.48) (0.31-0.45) (0.14-0.24) (0.17-0.24)
σ(ϵG∗T ) 0.36 0.36 σ(ϵG∗N ) 0.14 0.15
(0.28-0.45) (0.29-0.43) (0.10-0.18) (0.12-0.18)
Log-L 18.22 -17.00
Note: For each parameter I report the estimated posterior mean and 90% interval (in brackets) in the perfect labour mobility (PLM)
and nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) model. Log-likelihood based on the harmonic mean estimator.
Table 2.A3: Posterior distributions - Spain and rest of the EMU
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Country-specific shocks Area-wide shocks
Technology Demand
Tradable Non-tradable Tradable Non-tradable Technology Monetary
π 27.46 4.89 28.15 1.15 18.14 20.23
(35.82) (9.19) (7.17) (2.41) (17.10) (28.31)
πN 3.32 50.61 10.84 12.10 7.40 15.73
(2.67) (56.55) (8.30) (3.12) (6.22) (23.14)
π∗ 7.39 1.29 41.66 0.34 27.00 22.33
(9.46) (4.36) (16.10) (1.96) (29.40) (38.73)
π∗N 5.39 28.98 18.86 4.68 19.88 22.21
(4.72) (33.02) (13.35) (2.56) (15.03) (31.32)
∆Y 22.05 1.13 57.44 11.64 6.88 0.87
(36.60) (4.12) (35.82) (13.75) (9.01) (0.69)
∆YN 1.56 10.78 1.96 76.80 0.38 8.53
(0.97) (6.49) (0.81) (87.04) (0.29) (4.41)
∆Y∗ 2.58 0.47 75.81 9.67 8.54 2.92
(3.02) (2.07) (74.30) (10.20) (8.53) (1.89)
∆Y∗N 0.28 5.41 0.70 74.24 0.99 18.39
(0.23) (3.24) (0.86) (84.09) (0.68) (10.91)
R 8.94 2.11 39.74 0.49 33.34 15.37
(12.96) (7.56) (20.02) (3.22) (41.60) (14.63)
π − π∗ 40.83 7.93 47.54 1.76 0.54 1.41
(57.35) (18.43) (17.28) (4.85) (0.46) (1.64)
Note: Variance decomposition based on the parameter estimates of the nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) model (perfect
labour mobility (PLM) model in brackets)
Table 2.A4: Variance decomposition (in percent) - Spain and the rest of the EMU
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2.B Appendix - Figures
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Figure 2.B1: Prior (dashed) and posterior (solid) denisities for the structural parameters based on the
estimation of the perfect labour mobility (PLM) model
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Figure 2.B2: Prior (grey, dashed) and posterior (black, solid) denisities for the structural parameters
based on the estimation of the nesting perfect labour mobility (NPLM) model
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T H I R D E S S A Y
Budget-neutral fiscal rules targeting inflation differentials
In light of persistent inflation dispersion and high debt levels in the EMU, this paper in-
vestigates the desirability of budget-neutral fiscal policy rules that respond to the domestic
inflation differential. The paper employs a two-country DSGE model of a monetary union
with traded and non-traded goods. When consumption or labour income taxes respond to
the domestic inflation differential while lump-sum taxes balance the budget, a national fiscal
authority is able to reduce welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations by 1-4%. In the ab-
sence of lump-sum taxes, hybrid rules using only distortionary taxes can reduce welfare costs
by 6-10% under demand and supply disturbances. Gains in welfare stem from higher mean
consumption due to lower price dispersion when the fiscal authority actively compresses the
domestic inflation differential and thus domestic inflation.
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3.1 Introduction
During the 2000s, European countries’ inflation rates were characterised by a rising degree of hetero-
geneity. Prior to the introduction of the euro, countries with traditionally higher inflation rates managed
to lower them in order to comply with the Maastricht criteria. In the early years of the euro, it appeared
that nominal convergence had been attained.1 However, as documented by Rabanal (2009), the following
years showed a reversal in this trend. Specifically, inflation rates in the southern European periphery
consistently exceeded the average euro area inflation rate, leading to significant real appreciations and the
often-mentioned loss of competitiveness.
Deviations of the domestic inflation rate from the union-wide average, or in other words, inflation
differentials, are not necessarily an undesirable phenomenon in a monetary union. Since the nominal
exchange rate is fixed, inflation differentials are the natural by-product of asymmetric shocks and part of
the adjustment mechanism. They do pose a problem, however, for the conduct of monetary policy. Let us
consider a country whose inflation rate is above that of the union as a whole. The nominal interest rate set
by the centralised monetary authority does not increase as much as the Taylor principle would prescribe.
The country’s inflation rate enters the aggregate union-wide inflation rate with a certain weight so that the
Central Bank only partially responds to the increase in inflation in that country, a fact commonly referred
to as ‘one size does not fit all’.
Moreover, inflation differentials are particularly problematic if they are highly persistent, as observed
in the euro area after the introduction of the euro. The persistent deviations from the union-wide inflation
rate lead to a large divergence in competitiveness and are followed by a harmful readjustment period for
the countries whose real exchange rate has strongly appreciated.2 As a centralised monetary policy cannot
address the heterogeneity across member countries’ inflation rates, various papers have asked what role
could be assigned to national fiscal policies in mitigating differences in inflation rates and to what extent
such a policy would be desirable.
This paper seeks to add to the existing discussion on fiscal feedback to national differences by
analysing the effectiveness of fiscal tax rules that strategically react to the domestic inflation differential
1See Rogers (2007), who argues that nominal convergence across the euro area was achieved already in the ’90s.
2A large amount of research has been dedicated to identifying the drivers of inflation differentials across the EMU countries.
Prominent hypotheses are a catching-up process, as described in Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964); differences in institu-
tions/rigidities; and demand-driven effects. A non-exhaustive overview of research in this field includes López-Salido et al. (2005),
Canzoneri et al. (2006), Angeloni & Ehrmann (2007), Andrés et al. (2008), Rabanal (2009), Altissimo et al. (2011), and Morsy &
Jaumotte (2012).
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as a stabilising policy.3 Kirsanova et al. (2007) find that fiscal feedback to differences in inflation rates are
welfare-improving compared to fiscal rules responding to domestic output or the terms of trade only. In
their New Keynesian model of a monetary union with two countries, feedback comes through government
spending which is financed by government debt and constant taxes on labour income. Similarly, Beetsma
& Jensen (2005) work with government purchases as the fiscal instrument financed by either lump-sum
taxes or government debt. Furthermore, Vogel et al. (2013) study various tax instruments which also
allow for government debt in their fiscal rules. Both analyses find gains from responding to deviations in
the terms of trade.
Positive analyses by Duarte & Wolman (2002, 2008) add to the discussion by including a non-tradable
goods sector in the model of the monetary union. Their inclusion of non-traded varieties extends the scope
for large and persistent price and thus inflation differentials. The authors show that a fiscal authority can
successfully compress inflation differentials using a fiscal rule for ‘pro-cyclical’ labour income taxes. A
labour income tax that is lowered in response to a positive domestic inflation differential, i.e. when the
domestic inflation rate is above the union-wide average, compresses inflation differentials, although the
volatility of domestic inflation might increase.
The existing studies focus on non-distortionary instruments and allow the issuance of public debt to
finance the fiscal intervention. In the European context, however, it is particularly interesting to inspect
budget-neutral fiscal rules that abstract from issuing new public debt. The southern periphery of the
euro area experienced a rise in the levels of public debt, rendering debt-financed policies that target
inflation differentials potentially unattainable. Thus, this paper adds to the existing literature by explicitly
considering budget-neutral policies and continues along the lines of a large body of research studying the
optimal conduct of fiscal policy via simple rules in a monetary union.4
Furthermore, this paper is related to the literature concerned with fiscal devaluations, as it consid-
ers budget-neutral policies which became explicitly relevant in the context of the European debt crisis.
Prominent works in this field by von Thadden & Lipinska (2013), Farhi et al. (2014), and Engler et al.
(2014) investigate the effectiveness of a unilateral tax shift to boost competitiveness of a member country
of a monetary union. The distinguishing aspect of the analysis performed in this paper compared to the
existing literature on fiscal devaluations is this paper’s focus on temporary tax shifts in response to con-
3Considering the inflation differential, i.e. the difference between a country’s domestic inflation and that of the union, as the
fiscal target has the simple advantage that it is easy to measure in a monetary union with several member states. Indicators such
as terms of trade or differences in inflation rates are more difficult to apply in a framework of more than two countries such as the
EMU.
4In addition to the works mentioned above, one should name Lombardo & Sutherland (2004), Beetsma & Jensen (2004, 2005),
Pappa & Vassilatos (2007), Gali & Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009), and Kirsanova & Wren-Lewis (2012) as notable advances in
this research area. In the European context, Evers (2012), Evers (2015), and Werning & Farhi (2012) among others have analysed
the desirability of fiscal unions.
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temporaneous discrepancies in the domestic and the union-wide inflation rate instead of permanent tax
shifts.
Specifically, this paper analyses the effectiveness of four fiscal rules in reducing welfare costs arising
from business cycle fluctuations. The tax instruments considered by the analysis are consumption, labour
income, and lump-sum taxes that potentially balance the fiscal budget. Consumption taxes in the form of
value-added taxes were one of the primary fiscal instruments to be adjusted during the global financial as
well as the European crisis in several European countries and thus represent an obvious candidate for a
fiscal tax rule to examine. This paper also considers labour income taxes and determines the benefits of
using this instrument as suggested but not quantified by Duarte & Wolman (2008).
The welfare analysis suggests that consumption (labour income) taxes should be raised (lowered)
when domestic inflation exceeds the union-wide average. Second, the fiscal rules for which lump-sum
taxes balance the budget are able to reduce welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations by 1-4%. They
do so by reducing the volatility of the inflation differential and domestic inflation, which lowers mean
price dispersion and raises mean consumption. Interestingly, hybrid rules in which the fiscal budget is
balanced by a distortionary tax outperform the rules relying on lump-sum financing and reduce welfare
costs by 6-10% under the full stochastic setup. This is because they can combine the benefits of the rules
relying on lump-sum financing, when the two tax instruments move in opposite directions. By doing so,
inflationary responses are compressed most effectively.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the setup of the model and the channels through
which inflation differentials arise. After declaring the baseline calibration in Section 3.3, Section 3.4
performs a welfare analysis for the four fiscal rules which are investigated. This section also presents the
welfare gains or losses from the fiscal rules conditional on the shock specification and discusses impulse-
response functions to compare the dynamics of the model under the different fiscal rules to the baseline
in which distortionary taxes are constant. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model
The model is similar to that of Duarte & Wolman (2008) and consists of two countries of equal size,
home (H) and foreign (F), which constitute a monetary union. Each country is populated by a measure
one of households which have access to an internationally traded asset. In each country there is a sector
producing tradable goods which are traded within the monetary union. There is also a sector producing
non-tradable goods, which can only be consumed by domestic households and the domestic government.
Both countries are subject to nominal rigidities in the goods market in both sectors. The model abstracts
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from migration, i.e. labour is immobile across countries. Within a country, however, labour is assumed
to be perfectly mobile across sectors.
The following paragraphs describe the setup of the home economy. The structure of the foreign
economy is analogous if not explicitly stated otherwise. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk.
3.2.1 Households
Households maximise their expected lifetime utility,
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk [U(Ct+k) − V(Lt+k)] , (3.1)
where E denotes the expectations operator and β ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor. Households derive utility
from consumption, Ct, and disutility from supplying labour, Lt.
The aggregate consumption index, Ct, is composed of consumption of tradable, CT,t, and non-tradable,
CN,t, goods, as in
Ct =
[
(1 − δ) 1ι C ι−1ιT,t + δ
1
ι C
ι−1
ι
N,t
] ι
ι−1
. (3.2)
The elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods is expressed by ι, while δ denotes
the steady-state share of non-tradable goods in the aggregate consumption index. The price of the final
consumption good is given by
Pt =
[
(1 − δ)P1−ιT,t + δP1−ιN,t
] 1
1−ι , (3.3)
where PT,t and PN,t denote the prices of traded and non-traded goods respectively.
Households choose the optimal allocation of consumption expenditures across different types of
goods. The optimisation yields the following demand functions
CT,t = (1 − δ)
(
PT,t
Pt
)−ι
Ct and (3.4)
CN,t = δ
(
PN,t
Pt
)−ι
Ct . (3.5)
Households have access to a riskless internationally traded bond, Bt, which pays out the gross nominal
interest rate, Rt, in t+1. In line with von Thadden & Lipinska (2013), households pay a consumption tax,
τCt , on their consumption; a labour income tax, τ
L
t , on their labour income; and lump-sum taxes denoted
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by τlumpt . The intertemporal budget constraint expressed in real terms is given by
(1 + τCt )Ct +
Bt
Pt
= Rt−1
Bt−1
Pt
+ Πt + (1 − τLt )wtLt − τlumpt , (3.6)
where wt stands for the real wage in the economy and Πt for profit transfers from the ownership of
domestic firms. The wage is identical across sectors within the economy due to the assumption of perfect
labour mobility across sectors and the absence of wage rigidities.
The optimal paths of Ct and Lt are described by the set of optimality conditions derived from the
household’s utility maximisation problem. The labour supply decision and the intertemporal Euler equa-
tion are given by
(1 − τLt )Wt
(1 + τCt )Pt
=
V ′(Lt)
U′(Ct)
and (3.7)
U′(Ct) = βEt
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣U′(Ct+1) Rt
πt+1
1 + τCt
1 + τCt+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (3.8)
where πt+1 = Pt+1Pt denotes gross consumer price inflation net of taxes.
3.2.2 Firms
In both sectors, intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Retailers use
intermediate varieties as input for the production of final goods.
Retailers
The retail sector is characterised by perfect competition. Retail firms combine intermediate goods to
produce the final good of their respective sector. In the non-traded sector, the final good, YN,t, is pro-
duced with technology YN,t =
(∫ 1
0 YN,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, where ϵ is the elasticity of substitution across different
varieties, YN(i), of the non-tradable good. Retailers in the non-traded sector maximise their profit
max PN,tYN,t −
∫ 1
0
PN,t(i)YN,t(i)di (3.9)
given their production technology, which yields the demand function
YN,t(i) =
(
PN,t(i)
PN,t
)−ϵ
YN,t , (3.10)
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where PN,t(i) is the price for variety i of the non-traded good and PN,t =
(∫ 1
0 PN,t(i)
1−ϵdi
) 1
1−ϵ
.
Retailers producing the final traded good, YT,t, combine intermediate home- and imported foreign-
produced traded goods, YH,t(i) and YF,t(i). They maximise their profits according to
max PT,tYT,t −
∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)YH,t(i)di −
∫ 1
0
PF,t(i)YF,t(i)di (3.11)
subject to technologies
YT,t =
[
(1 − ω) 1φ Y
φ−1
φ
H,t + ω
1
φ Y
φ−1
φ
F,t
] φ
φ−1
, (3.12)
YH,t =
(∫ 1
0
YH,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
and (3.13)
YF,t =
(∫ 1
0
YF,t(i)
ϵ−1
ϵ di
) ϵ
ϵ−1
, (3.14)
where φ is the elasticity of substitution between final home and foreign traded goods in the production of
YT , and ω denotes the steady-state share of imported goods in the final traded good. An ω < 0.5 implies
home bias. The demand functions resulting from the profit maximisation read
YdH,t(i) = (1 − ω)
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−ϵ (PH,t
PT,t
)−φ
YT,t and (3.15)
YdF,t(i) = ω
(
PF,t(i)
PF,t
)−ϵ (PF,t
PT,t
)−φ
YT,t , (3.16)
where PH,t(i) and PF,t(i) are the prices of the home and foreign traded variety i and where the price indices
are defined as PH,t =
(∫ 1
0 PH,t(i)
1−ϵ
) 1
1−ϵ
, PF,t =
(∫ 1
0 PF,t(i)
1−ϵ
) 1
1−ϵ
, and PT,t =
[
(1 − ω)P1−φH,t + ωP1−φF,t
] 1
1−φ .
Intermediate-goods producers
In each sector there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], which set
their prices in a Calvo fashion. Given linear production technologies, firms produce intermediate-goods
varieties. The technologies, ZS ,t, are sector- and country-specific, where S ∈ {T,N}.
An intermediate-goods producer i produces non-tradable intermediate varieties with
YN,t(i) = exp(ZN,t)LN,t(i) (3.17)
and seeks to maximise its expected profit given that with probability θ the firm will not be able to adjust
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its price, PN,t(i), in a given period. The optimisation problem solves
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
[
YN,t+k|t(i)PN,t(i) −Wt+kLN,t+k(i)] , (3.18)
where Qt,t+k = βk
U′(Ct+k)
U′(Ct)
Pt
Pt+k
1+τCt
1+τCt+k
is the stochastic discount factor, YN,t+k|t(i) output of firm i in t + k given
the price set in t, and Wt the nominal wage.
Similarly, intermediate traded goods produced in the home economy by firm i derive from the pro-
duction function
YH,t(i) = exp(ZT,t)LT,t(i) . (3.19)
This firm sets its price, PH,t(i), for home-produced traded varieties to maximise
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
θkQt,t+k
[
YH,t+k|t(i)PH,t(i) −Wt+kLT,t+k(i)] (3.20)
given that with probability θ it cannot readjust its price.
Terms of trade
Incorporating non-traded goods in the model results in two measures of competitiveness, the external and
the internal terms of trade. The (external) terms of trade, Tt, relate the price of foreign-produced traded
goods to the price of home-produced traded goods, i.e.
Tt =
PF,t
PH,t
. (3.21)
The trade position of the home economy improves when the terms of trade increase, because domestically-
produced traded goods become relatively cheaper. The internal terms of trade, TN,t, are defined as
TN,t =
PN,t
PT,t
and (3.22)
T ∗N,t =
P∗N,t
P∗T,t
(3.23)
and deliver a measure for the competitiveness of the traded sector relative to the non-traded sector within
an economy.
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3.2.3 Policy makers
Central monetary authority
Monetary policy is conducted at the union-level. Following von Thadden & Lipinska (2013), the central
bank sets the union-wide gross nominal interest rate, Rt, in response to the union-wide average consumer
price inflation net of taxes, πUt = (πt)
0.5(π∗t )0.5. The monetary policy rule à la Taylor (1993) reads
Rt =
1
β
(
πUt
)ϕ
, (3.24)
where ϕ captures the ‘hawkishness’ of the central bank, i.e. how strongly the central bank reacts to
inflation deviations.
Fiscal authority
In both countries the government consumes non-tradable goods. The stream of public consumption rela-
tive to total GDP within a country follows an exogenous AR(1) process of the form
(Gt/Yt) = (G¯/Y¯) + ρg(Gt−1/Yt−1) + ϵG,t , (3.25)
where |ρG | < 1 and ϵG,t ∼ N(0, σ2G). The government uses its available tax income to finance its expendi-
tures. The fiscal authority’s budget constraint reads
τ
lump
t + τ
C
t Ct + τ
L
t wtLt = Gt . (3.26)
The analysis is concerned with quantifying the welfare gains when the home economy strategically
reacts to variations in its domestic inflation differential with one of its available tax instruments. In order
to identify the effects of a specific fiscal rule of the home economy, it is assumed that the foreign economy
keeps its distortionary taxes constant. That is, the budget of the foreign fiscal authority is balanced by
lump-sum taxes so that the budget constraint of the foreign government reads
τ
∗lump
t + τ¯
∗CC∗t + τ¯
∗Lw∗t L
∗
t = G
∗
t , (3.27)
where bar-variables denote deterministic steady-state values.
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3.2.4 Market clearing and equilibrium
The market-clearing conditions for traded and non-traded goods, the labour market, and the international
bond market are given by
YT,t = CT,t , (3.28)
YN,t = CN,t +Gt , (3.29)
Lt =
∫ 1
0
LT,t(i) + LN,t(i)di and (3.30)
Bt = −B∗t . (3.31)
To close the model, a debt-elastic interest rate as proposed by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003) is incorpo-
rated to induce stationarity on private debt. For the impulse response functions the model is approximated
linearly around a zero-inflation steady state.
3.2.5 Sources of inflation differentials
Using the definition of the price of consumption in H, Pt, and its analogue for country F, P∗t , one can
analyse the different sources of consumer price differentials, which cause differences in inflation rates.
First, the ratio of aggregate consumer prices of both countries is given by
Pt
P∗t
=
PT,t
P∗T,t
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ 1 − δ + δT 1−ιN,t1 − δ + δT ∗1−ιN,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
1
1−ι
. (3.32)
Ignoring the ratio of traded goods prices for a moment, it is easily seen that the presence of non-traded
goods (δ > 0) is an essential ingredient of price (inflation) differentials. Non-traded goods prices are
not in direct competition across countries. Hence, different prices for non-tradable goods translate into
differing internal terms of trade across countries. These lead to price differentials even if the price indices
for the final traded good are identical across countries, i.e. PT,t = P∗T,t.
Going one step further, one can analyse to what extent inflation differentials might arise from the
traded goods sector. One can express the ratio of traded goods prices as
PT,t
P∗T,t
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ (1 − ω)P1−φH,t + ωP1−φF,t(1 − ω)P1−φF,t + ωP1−φH,t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
1
1−φ
, (3.33)
which shows to what extent the presence of home or foreign bias is essential in creating price differentials.
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Under ω = 0.5, when home bias is absent, traded goods price indices are identical across countries. When
ω , 0.5, price (and inflation) differentials arise from the external terms of trade, i.e. the relative price of
foreign to home-produced traded goods. Note that neither of the two channels described above rely on
the inclusion of rigid prices.
3.3 Calibration
This section presents the benchmark parameter values of the model. The calibration is symmetric across
countries and one model period corresponds to one quarter.
3.3.1 Private sector
The household’s utility is governed by
U(Ct) =
C1−σt − 1
1 − σ and (3.34)
V(Lt) =
L1+κt
1 + κ
, (3.35)
where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion and κ the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply. The discount factor, β, takes a standard value of 0.99, while the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, σ, as well as the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, κ, is set to one (log-utility in
consumption).
As in Duarte & Wolman (2008), the share of non-tradable goods in the consumption basket, δ, takes
a value of 0.4 and the elasticities of substitution, ι, φ, and ϵ, are set to 0.74, 1.5, and 10 respectively. In
contrast to these authors, the calibration allows for home bias in the production of the final traded good
and sets ω = 0.4.
The Calvo parameter, θ, is assumed to be identical across sectors and countries. The expected price
lifetime is 3 quarters such that θ = 2/3, which is close to estimates by Druant et al. (2012), who find for
a sample of 17 European countries that, on average, prices remain unchanged for around 10 months.
3.3.2 Public sector
Monetary policy is characterised by a standard Taylor coefficient of ϕ = 1.5. For the fiscal side, this
work follows von Thadden & Lipinska (2013) and Duarte & Wolman (2008) by assuming a steady-
state consumption tax rate, τ¯C , of 15% and a steady-state labour income tax rate, τ¯L, of 18%. In order
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to comply with the budget constraint of the government, the steady-state share of public consumption
relative to domestic GDP is set to 27.13%.
3.3.3 Shock processes
The analysis uses the estimated shock processes and variance-covariance matrices of Duarte & Wolman
(2008) for the technology and government spending processes. Technology shocks follow an AR(1)
process, Zt = AZt−1 + ϵZ,t, with covariance matrix Ω, where Zt = [ZT,t,ZN,t,Z∗T,t,Z
∗
N,t],
A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.708 0.169 0.006 −0.435
−0.023 0.707 −0.061 −0.038
0.006 −0.435 0.708 0.169
−0.061 −0.038 −0.023 0.707
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (3.36)
and
Ω =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0.16 0.05 0.03 0
0.05 0.06 0 0
0.03 0 0.16 0.05
0 0 0.05 0.06
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
× 10−3 . (3.37)
Shocks to the share of government consumption of output follow independent AR(1) processes with
persistence, ρg, of 0.42 and variance σ2G = 2.14 × 10−4.
3.4 Welfare analysis
In order to understand whether a fiscal tax rule that responds to the domestic inflation differential can be
welfare-improving, this section determines and compares the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations
under different tax regimes for a given union-wide monetary policy.
The welfare analysis follows the framework of Lucas (1987, 2003) and computes the consumption
compensation, v, that a household would be willing to pay to avoid moving from the deterministic steady
state to the stochastic environment. Formally, the consumption compensation, v, solves
E
∞∑
t=0
βt[U(Ct) − V(Lt)] =
∞∑
t=0
βt[U((1 + v)C¯) − V(L¯)] , (3.38)
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where bar-variables denote the deterministic steady state of the model variables.
The unconditional expectation of the household’s lifetime utility in the ergodic distribution of the
model must be equal to the lifetime utility of the household in the deterministic steady state paying the
consumption compensation, v. Using a second-order Taylor approximation on both sides, one can express
v as a function of first- and second-order moments of the ergodic distribution of consumption and hours.
v can be decomposed into four components
v = vmeanC + vmeanL + vvolatilityC + vvolatilityL , (3.39)
which allows the inspection of contributions of mean effects that capture the difference between the mean
in the ergodic distribution of the model and the deterministic steady state, vmeanC and vmeanL, and volatility
effects, vvolatilityC and vvolatilityL. In order to accurately calculate the moments of the ergodic distribution,
the model is written recursively and solved in Dynare using a second-order accurate perturbation. This
paper employs the method developed by Lan & Meyer-Gohde (2013) to find accurate first- and second-
order moments analytically.
The analysis considers four tax regimes of fiscal feedback to the domestic inflation differential: a
responsive consumption or labour income tax where the fiscal budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes, (1)
and (2), or when the fiscal budget has to be balanced by the remaining distortionary tax, (3) and (4). The
regimes take the following forms
(1) τLt = τ¯
L and τCt = τ¯
C + ζ
(
ln πt − ln πUt
)
(2) τCt = τ¯
C and τLt = τ¯
L + ζ
(
ln πt − ln πUt
)
(3) τlumpt = 0 and τ
C
t = τ¯
C + ζ
(
ln πt − ln πUt
)
(4) τlumpt = 0 and τ
L
t = τ¯
L + ζ
(
ln πt − ln πUt
)
where ζ denotes the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to the inflation differential
(
ln πt − ln πUt
)
, i.e.
when domestic inflation is one percentage point above the union-wide aggregate the tax rate increases by
ζ percentage points.
These four regimes are compared to a baseline economy with ζ = 0, i.e. with constant distortionary
taxes, and where the fiscal budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes to evaluate the desirability of the fiscal
rules. The analysis varies the policy parameter ζ over a grid and searches for the ζ at which welfare losses
are minimised relative to the benchmark.
Figure 3.1 displays the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations for different ζ relative to the base-
line scenario. For each scenario there exists a point at which welfare losses are minimised relative to
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Note: Rules (3) and (4) do not cross the benchmark intersection at ζ = 0 because they abstract from lump-sum taxes. For instance,
for Rule (3) when consumption taxes are constant at ζ = 0 labour income taxes have to balance the fiscal budget and vice versa. The
fluctuations of the distortionary labour income tax cause different welfare costs than if lump-sum taxes would balance the budget.
As a consequence, at ζ = 0 welfare costs of Rule (3) and (4) are different from 100.
Figure 3.1: Welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations for different values of ζ relative to constant
distortionary taxes when the budget is financed exclusively by lump-sum taxes (=100) for rules (1)-(4)
constant distortionary taxes. Rules (1) and (3) display a minimum at positive values for ζ, i.e. ideally the
consumption tax should be raised in response to a domestic inflation rate that is above the union average.
The optima of rules (2) and (4), on the other hand, are attained at a negative value for ζ, which is in line
with the analysis by Duarte & Wolman (2008), who discuss a pro-cyclical labour income tax. Ideally,
labour income taxes should be lowered in response to a positive domestic inflation differential.
Table 3.1 displays the gains of the fiscal rules relative to the baseline at their respective optimum, ζ∗,
for the four different scenarios.5 In all cases the majority of the welfare costs arise in the mean component
of consumption, vmeanC , due to the difference between mean consumption in the ergodic distribution of
the model and the level of consumption in the deterministic steady state. The welfare costs in the mean
component of consumption, i.e. the difference between the unconditional expectation of consumption
in the ergodic distribution and its deterministic steady state, arise as follows. Following an exogenous
disturbance, only a fraction of firms can adjust their prices due to the Calvo-pricing mechanism.
5Note that the optimal tax elasticities seem rather high, especially for Rule (3). This is largely explained by the model setup
considering two countries of equal size. In order to create an inflation differential of 1%, the model needs strong variations in the
domestic inflation rate, as the union-wide aggregate partly comoves with domestic inflation, ceteris paribus. The large disturbances
necessary to create such sizeable inflation differentials justify the size of the optimal tax elasticities.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(ζ∗ = 6) (ζ∗ = −5) (ζ∗ = 11) (ζ∗ = −3)
baseline responsive ∆% responsive ∆% responsive ∆% responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9945 4.17 -1.0188 1.83 -0.9276 10.62 -0.9652 6.99
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6787 8.74 -0.6845 8.17 -0.7435 2.50 -0.6451 11.98
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1375 -5.30 -0.1344 -5.00 0.0047 8.40 -0.0100 6.99
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0696 -2.63 -0.0446 -0.23 -0.1515 -10.52 -0.2930 -24.16
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1087 3.36 -0.1552 -1.11 -0.0373 10.25 -0.0172 12.18
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6834 0.01 0.6833 0.00 0.6834 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9386 0.01 0.9384 -0.01 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.01 1.0007 -0.02 1.0008 -0.01 1.0005 -0.03
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0004 -0.01 1.0006 0.01 1.0002 -0.03
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0081 28.58 0.0064 2.82 0.0119 89.86 0.0165 164.22
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0147 -13.00 0.0176 3.95 0.0086 -49.03 0.0059 -65.39
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -6.09 0.0033 -7.12 0.0040 13.53 0.0028 -21.66
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -5.52 0.0013 -12.20 0.0014 -7.87 0.0013 -16.77
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0085 - - - 0.0153 - 0.0272 -
std. dev. labour tax - - - 0.0066 - 0.0141 - 0.0038 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0149 -3.87 0.0185 19.35 - - - -
Table 3.1: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments, and percentage gains and differences under the
welfare-maximising tax rule (responsive) relative to constant taxes (baseline)
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This partial adjustment of the price level leads to price dispersion across different varieties of goods
produced by the continuum of intermediate-goods producers. The larger the response of inflation, the
wider is the underlying dispersion across prices. Price dispersion causes an inefficient allocation of
resources as retailers use different quantities of the available varieties to produce the final good. The
inefficiency in the production process of the final good ultimately results in a lower mean of consumption
in the ergodic distribution of the model.
Considering rules (1) and (2), the responsive consumption tax performs better at its optimum than
the labour income tax. In both cases, the bulk of the welfare gain originates in the mean component
of consumption, i.e. by actively compressing inflation and inflation differentials, the fiscal authority
compresses the level of price dispersion and thus increases mean consumption in the ergodic distribution
of the model.
Both hybrid rules, which abstract from lump-sum taxes, outperform rules (1) and (2). Welfare costs
are reduced to the largest extent under Rule (3), where labour income taxes balance the budget. Under
both hybrid rules only the volatility component of consumption suffers, whereas the remaining compo-
nents of the welfare costs improve.
The picture presented by Table 3.1 suggests that the hybrid rules can outperform the rules where the
budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes. This result might, however, hinge on the type of shock causing
the inflation differential. The following paragraphs repeat the previous analysis for the complete shock
structure specified in the calibration, as well as for technology or government spending shocks only, to
assess the robustness of the previous findings. The mechanism for each rule is discussed using impulse
response functions for shocks to domestic government spending and productivity in the non-traded sector
that cause an inflation differential of the home economy of 0.1 percentage points on impact.
Spillovers to the other sector’s technology are disabled for the impulse response functions. As the
rules work similarly under both types of technology shocks, only the impulse response function to non-
traded technology will be discussed.
3.4.1 Rule (1) by shock specification
Table 3.2 displays the decomposition of the gains in welfare from the consumption tax rule when lump-
sum taxes balance the budget conditional on the shock specification, i.e. under the complete shock struc-
ture as well as under technology or government spending shocks only. Rule (1) performs similarly well
under demand and supply disturbances, as in both cases the highest gain stems from the mean compo-
nent of consumption, while mean hours and consumption volatility effects lower the benefits from the
consumption tax rule.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9945 4.17 -0.5555 -0.5353 3.63 -0.4820 -0.4588 4.79
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6787 8.74 -0.4834 -0.4290 9.80 -0.2860 -0.2497 7.53
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1375 -5.30 -0.0293 -0.0549 -4.60 -0.0532 -0.0826 -6.11
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0696 -2.63 -0.0326 -0.0473 -2.63 -0.0094 -0.0221 -2.64
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1087 3.36 -0.0101 -0.0042 1.06 -0.1334 -0.1044 6.01
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.01 0.6836 0.6837 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9385 0.9385 0.00 0.9385 0.9385 0.00
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.01 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.00
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0081 28.58 0.0055 0.0066 20.42 0.0030 0.0045 53.47
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0147 -13.00 0.0045 0.0029 -35.39 0.0163 0.0145 -11.53
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -6.09 0.0026 0.0024 -6.72 0.0024 0.0023 -5.37
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -5.52 0.0011 0.0011 -5.47 0.0010 0.0009 -5.57
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0085 - - 0.0064 - - 0.0056 -
std. dev. labour tax - - - - - - - - -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0149 -3.87 0.0027 0.0055 103.07 0.0152 0.0139 -8.55
Table 3.2: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments, and percentage gains and differences under Rule (1) at
ζ∗ = 6 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification
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The benefits of raising the consumption tax in response to a positive domestic inflation differential
can be explained using impulse response functions. Figure 3.2 displays the impulse response functions
of key variables of the model for a shock to technology in the non-traded sector for the baseline scenario
as well as under the responsive consumption tax rule (ζ∗ = 6). The increase in productivity triggers a fall
in marginal costs of the firms producing non-traded goods so that these firms seek to lower prices. Non-
traded goods become relatively cheaper than traded goods, so the internal terms of trade fall. Firms in the
non-traded sector lower their demand for labour, causing a fall in the domestic nominal wage and thus
the marginal costs of the intermediate firms in the traded sector too. They can hence lower their prices as
well, which improves the external terms of trade. Consumer price inflation falls below the union-average
and H faces a negative inflation differential.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation under Rule (1)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (1) = orange dotted line
Under Rule (1), the consumption tax is lowered in response to the negative inflation differential, so
that consumption increases by more relative to the baseline scenario due to lower prices and taxes on
consumption goods. The increase in domestic demand is met by a stronger increase in production, which
drives up marginal costs for all firms causing them to lower prices by less compared to the baseline sce-
nario. As a consequence, the response of CPI inflation and the inflation differential is slightly dampened.
The impulse response functions confirm the observations from Table 3.2 that Rule (1) is able to dampen
the responses of hours, CPI inflation, and the domestic inflation differential while raising the volatility of
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consumption. The compression of inflation lowers mean price dispersion, which explains the large gain
arising from the mean component of consumption.
A government spending shock increases the demand for non-traded goods such that firms in this
sector increase their production, as displayed in Figure 3.3. Marginal costs rise and firms in the non-
traded sector seek to raise their prices. The internal terms of trade increase. Higher non-traded output
implies a higher demand for labour and thus higher economy-wide wages, driving up marginal costs for
firms and thus also prices in the traded sector. Relative to foreign-produced traded goods, home-produced
traded goods become more expensive, as evidenced by the deterioration of the external terms of trade.
Overall, inflation increases relative to the union and the economy faces a positive inflation differential.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation under Rule (1)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (1) = orange dotted line
Under Rule (1), consumption taxes increase, leading to a more pronounced fall in domestic consump-
tion compared to the baseline scenario due to higher prices as well as consumption taxes. As a result,
firms in the non-traded sector raise their production by less after a government spending shock. Marginal
costs, the demand for labour, and the nominal wage increase by less. The policy dampens the response of
CPI inflation and thus the inflation differential.
Again, the impulse response functions confirm the picture presented by Table 3.2. Under the govern-
ment spending shock, the responsive consumption tax slightly compresses inflation responses as well as
the response of hours but raises the volatility of consumption. The compression of inflation gives smaller
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room for price dispersion, explaining the gain arising in the mean consumption component.
3.4.2 Rule (2) by shock specification
In contrast to Rule (1), Rule (2) does not perform equally well under supply and demand disturbances.
Table 3.3 shows that the responsive labour income tax rule raises welfare costs for the given sensitivity
(ζ∗ = −5) when only government spending shocks are present in the model. Under technology shocks
only, the benefits from Rule (2) arise from mean effects in both consumption and hours, while volatility
effects slightly dampen the benefits. Under government spending shocks only, a gain still arises in the
mean component of consumption but is outweighed by a large loss in the mean component of hours as
well as in both volatility components.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the mechanism of the fiscal rule for labour income taxes when responding to
an inflation differential caused by a shock to non-traded sector technology relative to the baseline dis-
cussed earlier. In response to a negative inflation differential, the labour income tax is raised at the given
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Figure 3.4: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation under Rule (2)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (2) = orange dotted line
sensitivity. The nominal wage increases to satisfy the labour supply decision of the household, raising
marginal costs in both sectors. This leads firms in both sectors to lower their prices by less compared to
the baseline scenario.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -1.0188 1.83 -0.5555 -0.5115 7.93 -0.4820 -0.5070 -5.20
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6845 8.17 -0.4834 -0.4259 10.36 -0.2860 -0.2587 5.66
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.1344 -5.00 -0.0293 -0.0348 -0.99 -0.0532 -0.0996 -9.63
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.0446 -0.23 -0.0326 -0.0346 -0.35 -0.0094 -0.0098 -0.09
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.1552 -1.11 -0.0101 -0.0162 -1.09 -0.1334 -0.1389 -1.15
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.01 0.6836 0.6837 0.00
mean hours 0.9385 0.9386 0.01 0.9385 0.9385 0.00 0.9385 0.9385 0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0007 -0.02 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0004 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0064 2.82 0.0055 0.0057 3.00 0.0030 0.0030 2.22
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0176 3.95 0.0045 0.0057 26.39 0.0163 0.0167 2.05
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0033 -7.12 0.0026 0.0024 -7.68 0.0024 0.0022 -6.45
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0013 -12.20 0.0011 0.0010 -12.22 0.0010 0.0009 -12.17
std. dev. cons. tax - - - - - - - - -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0066 - - 0.0050 - - 0.0044 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 0.0185 19.35 0.0027 0.0043 59.26 0.0152 0.0180 18.42
Table 3.3: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments, and percentage gains and differences under Rule (2) at
ζ∗ = −5 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification
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The smaller drop in prices dampens the increase in domestic demand by domestic households so that
firms’ output increases by less under the responsive fiscal rule compared to the baseline scenario. As
reported in Table 3.3, the volatility of CPI inflation and the inflation differential is lowered leading to
lower price dispersion in expectations. This explains the large gain that arises in the mean component of
consumption.
Figure 3.5 repeats the analysis for a government spending shock and shows that firms in the non-traded
sector still increase their production. However, lower labour income taxes lead to a smaller increase in
the nominal wage that is necessary to fulfil the labour supply decision of the household.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation under Rule (2)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (2) = orange dotted line
As a consequence, marginal costs in both sectors increase by less, causing a smaller response of
inflation under the responsive fiscal rule as shown also by the lower volatility of the inflation variables in
Table 3.3.
3.4.3 Rule (3) by shock specification
The previous paragraphs established the benefits of raising (lowering) consumption (labour income) taxes
in response to a positive domestic inflation differential and to what extent these benefits are dependent
on the shock structure. It remains to be clarified to what extent the hybrid rules are able to outperform
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the previously discussed rules that rely on lump-sum financing of the fiscal budget. Under Rule (3) the
fiscal authority raises the consumption tax while labour income taxes balance the budget when domestic
inflation exceeds the union-wide aggregate. Table 3.4 shows that Rule (3) is beneficial under either shock
structure at the given sensitivity.
Under technology shocks only, the gain in welfare stems largely from the mean component of con-
sumption due to lower price dispersion, while the volatility of consumption increases. Yet despite a
reduction of the welfare loss under government spending shocks, Rule (3) destabilises inflation and the
inflation differential and raises price dispersion. In order to understand these findings, Figure 3.6 displays
the mechanism of Rule (3) following a technology shock in the non-traded sector.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation under Rule (3)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (3) = orange dotted line
As under Rule (1), lowering of the consumption tax increases domestic demand, raising production
and marginal costs in both sectors so that domestic firms lower their prices by less. At the same time,
the labour income tax increases to finance the proportional increase in government spending, letting the
nominal wage increase, thereby driving up marginal costs even further. The response of domestic inflation
to the technology shock is dampened to a large extent because Rule (3) combines the benefits of rules (1)
and (2). Consumption taxes fall while labour income taxes increase in response to the domestic inflation
differential, making the hybrid rule highly effective in light of technology shocks.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9276 10.62 -0.5555 -0.4656 16.18 -0.4820 -0.4615 4.24
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.7435 2.50 -0.4834 -0.4104 13.14 -0.2860 -0.3330 -9.77
vmeanL: -0.0825 0.0047 8.40 -0.0293 -0.0043 4.51 -0.0532 0.0090 12.89
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.1515 -10.52 -0.0326 -0.0440 -2.05 -0.0094 -0.1071 -20.27
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.0373 10.25 -0.0101 -0.0069 0.59 -0.1334 -0.0303 21.39
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6833 0.00 0.6835 0.6836 0.01 0.6836 0.6836 0.00
mean hours 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01 0.9385 0.9384 -0.00 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0008 -0.01 1.0006 1.0003 -0.03 1.0003 1.0004 0.02
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0006 0.01 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0004 0.02
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0119 89.86 0.0055 0.0064 16.24 0.0030 0.0100 237.75
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0086 -49.03 0.0045 0.0037 -17.63 0.0163 0.0078 -52.34
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0040 13.53 0.0026 0.0024 -6.60 0.0024 0.0032 32.82
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0014 -7.87 0.0011 0.0008 -29.95 0.0010 0.0011 14.74
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0153 - - 0.0087 - - 0.0125 -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0141 - - 0.0074 - - 0.0119 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 - - 0.0027 - - 0.0152 - -
Table 3.4: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments, and percentage gains and differences under Rule (3) at
ζ∗ = 11 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification
62
Rule (3) works differently, however, for government spending shocks as displayed in Figure 3.7. It
prescribes an increase in consumption taxes as well as an increase in labour income taxes to finance public
spending. Private demand is drastically lowered and the nominal wage increases to make up for the tax
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Figure 3.7: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation under Rule (3)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (3) = orange dotted line
hikes, raising marginal costs despite lower production. At the given sensitivity, CPI inflation as well as
the inflation differential react more strongly to the domestic government spending shock, which explains
the higher volatility of these two variables in Table 3.4. In contrast to the case of technology shocks, the
compression of inflation under government spending shocks fails due to the comovement of the two tax
instruments.
3.4.4 Rule (4) by shock specification
After establishing that the hybrid rule, Rule (3), can outperfom the rules relying on lump-sum taxes when
the tax instruments move in opposite directions, one must now ask how Rule (4) compares to Rule (3).
Table 3.5 shows that, similarly to Rule (3), Rule (4) lowers welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations
under both demand and supply disturbances for the given sensitivity. In contrast to Rule (3), however,
Rule (4) successfully compresses inflation and raises mean consumption under either shock structure.
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Complete shock Technology Government spending
structure shocks only shocks only
baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆% baseline responsive ∆%
Welfare loss of fluctuations -1.0378 -0.9652 6.99 -0.5555 -0.5312 4.37 -0.4820 -0.4338 9.99
Decomposition:
vmeanC : -0.7694 -0.6451 11.98 -0.4834 -0.4790 0.80 -0.2860 -0.1661 24.87
vmeanL: -0.0825 -0.0100 6.99 -0.0293 -0.0141 2.74 -0.0532 0.0042 11.90
vvolatilityC : -0.0422 -0.2930 -24.16 -0.0326 -0.0280 0.84 -0.0094 -0.2649 -53.00
vvolatilityL: -0.1437 -0.0172 12.18 -0.0101 -0.0101 0.00 -0.1334 -0.0071 26.21
Moments:
mean consumption 0.6833 0.6834 0.01 0.6835 0.6835 0.00 0.6836 0.6837 0.01
mean hours 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01 0.9385 0.9385 -0.00 0.9385 0.9384 -0.01
mean price disp. (T) 1.0009 1.0005 -0.03 1.0006 1.0005 -0.01 1.0003 1.0000 -0.02
mean price disp. (N) 1.0005 1.0002 -0.03 1.0003 1.0002 -0.01 1.0003 1.0000 -0.02
std. dev. consumption 0.0063 0.0165 164.22 0.0055 0.0051 -7.41 0.0030 0.0157 431.17
std. dev. hours 0.0169 0.0059 -65.39 0.0045 0.0045 -0.07 0.0163 0.0038 -76.99
std. dev. CPI inflation 0.0035 0.0028 -21.66 0.0026 0.0024 -4.96 0.0024 0.0013 -46.71
std. dev. inflation diff. 0.0015 0.0013 -16.77 0.0011 0.0010 -9.35 0.0010 0.0007 -27.56
std. dev. cons. tax - 0.0272 - - 0.0046 - - 0.0268 -
std. dev. labour tax - 0.0038 - - 0.0031 - - 0.0022 -
std. dev. lump-sum tax 0.0155 - - 0.0027 - - 0.0152 - -
Table 3.5: Welfare costs ×10−3, theoretical moments, and percentage gains and differences under Rule (4) at
ζ∗ = −3 (responsive) relative to constant distortionary taxes (baseline) by shock specification
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Figure 3.8 illustrates the mechanism of Rule (4) for a shock to technology in the non-traded sector. As
under Rule (2), labour income taxes increase, leading to increases in the nominal wage and thus marginal
costs for domestic firms which accordingly lower their prices by less compared to the baseline scenario.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse response functions after a shock to ZN of one standard deviation under Rule (4)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (4) = orange dotted line
Public spending increases proportionally to output at lower prices. Given a higher labour tax income,
consumption taxes decrease to balance the fiscal budget. As in the case of Rule (3), the large gains in
welfare arise because the two tax instruments move in opposite directions and thus combine the benefits
of rules (1) and (2) in compressing inflation.
Table 3.5 suggests that, in contrast to Rule (3), Rule (4) compresses inflation under government spend-
ing shocks only. Figure 3.9 shows that labour income taxes fall in response to lower prices, allowing for
lower nominal wages and marginal costs so that firms raise their prices by less. Simultaneously, the in-
crease in public spending is financed by higher consumption taxes which lower private demand, thereby
further decreasing marginal costs due to decreased production. The result is a largely muted response in
domestic inflation and a dampened inflation differential as suggested by Table 3.5. Overall, the large re-
duction in welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations under Rule (4) under government spending shocks
can, as under technology shocks, be explained by the opposed movement of the two tax instruments.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse response functions after a shock to G/Y of one standard deviation under Rule (4)
Baseline = solid line, responsive Rule (4) = orange dotted line
Comparing the hybrid rules (3) and (4) with each other, one can make the following observations:
despite a larger reduction in welfare costs through Rule (3) both under the complete shock structure and
under technology shocks only, Rule (4) is able to compress inflation differentials and raise mean con-
sumption under either shock specification. Rule (3) works along different lines under government spend-
ing shocks and actually raises inflation volatility and price dispersion. Under Rule (4) all welfare cost
components see an increase except for the volatility of consumption, whereas the mechanism of Rule (3)
is dependent on the shock specification. In this respect, Rule (4) delivers a more robust stabilisation
mechanism.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether a national fiscal authority should strategically react to the domestic in-
flation differential with an available tax instrument. In a two-country DSGE model with traded and
non-traded goods, the analysis considers four fiscal rules: responsive consumption and labour income
taxes when the governmental budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes, rules (1) and (2), or by the remain-
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ing distortionary tax, rules (3) and (4). It finds a large scope for fiscal intervention. The welfare analysis
shows that under demand as well as supply disturbances, all four rules reduce the welfare costs of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations relative to the benchmark in which distortionary taxes are held constant. Under the
full stochastic setup, both hybrid rules for which lump-sum taxes are absent outperform the rules relying
on lump-sum financing of government spending.
A robustness analysis discusses the dependence of the findings on the specified shock structure. It
finds that, except for the labour income tax rule under government spending shocks only, all rules are
beneficial under either type of disturbance, i.e. demand or supply shocks. Comparing the performance of
the two hybrid rules shows that letting labour income taxes respond to the domestic inflation differential
while consumption taxes balance the budget delivers the most robust stabilisation mechanism. This is
because under Rule (4), under both technology as well as government spending shocks, the two tax
instruments move in opposite directions. This combines the benefits of the two rules relying on lump-
sum financing so that inflation and inflation differentials are largely compressed and mean consumption
in the ergodic distribution is raised.
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